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CORPORATE ACQUISITION OF BROADCAST FACILITIES:
THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission, at the time of this writing,
is reconsidering applications for the transfer and assignment of seventeen
radio and television stations,' currently owned and operated by the American
Broadcasting Company (ABC), to a new corporation of the same name,
which will be a wholly owned subsidiary of International Telephone and
Telegraph Corporation (ITT). FCC approval of these applications would
clear the way for the completion of the proposed merger of ITT and ABC.
Under Section 310(b) of the Federal Communications Act, the Com-
mission must approve any transfer or assignment of stations before it can
legally take place? In the ITT case, however, the Commission must also
assume the task of considering the far more complex and significant problem
of the acquisition of the assets of a national broadcast network by a huge,
diversified, international corporation. In 1953 the FCC considered similar,
though less portentous, applications filed by ABC and United Paramount
Theaters, Inc., incident to an acquisition of the network by the theater
chain.3 The Commission, in that case, stated that:
In a technical sense, the Commission's function ... is to ap-
prove or disapprove the proposed transfer and assignments by ABC
of its AM, FM, and TV licenses . • to American Broadcasting-
Paramount Theaters, Inc. The statutory standard by which the ap-
proval or disapproval must be made is whether the transfer and
assignments are "in the public interest." By its very breadth, that
standard . . . raises fundamental issues far transcending in signifi-
cance those ordinarily attending a transfer or assignment proceeding
involving individual broadcast licenses. The facilities here involved
are the core of a far more important segment of the communications
industry . . . namely, a national network system of radio and tele-
vision broadcasting.'
1 On February 1, 1967, the FCC granted the Justice Department's petition for re-
consideration of the Commission's order of December 21, 1966, which had approved the
transfer and assignment of licenses for stations in Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New
York, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco. Just as this comment went to press, the FCC
completed its reconsideration and once again approved the proposed merger. Wall Street
Journal, June 23, 1967, p. 23, col. I.
2 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1964).
3 Paramount Television Prods., Inc., 17 F.C.C. 264 (1953).
4 Id. at 315. The Commission also indicated its intended approach to the problem:
We must therefore include in our review of the proposed merger the past
history and existing structure of the network broadcasting industry, and in
doing so, consider: (a) the place of networks in our system of radio and
television broadcasting; (b) the emergence of ABC in 1943 as an independent
network . . including the growth and accomplishments of ABC since 1943;
(c) the continued dominance of NBC and CBS in network broadcasting and
the reasons therefor, including the handicaps under which ABC has operated
and its resultant ability to provide the amount of competition which might
have been expecled from its establishment as an independent network; (d)
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Unlike mergers in most other industries, determining the propriety of
a merger in the broadcast industry frequently involves conflicts deriving
from concurrent consideration of the antitrust issues by the FCC and the
Justice Department. This concurrent jurisdiction is a result of the scheme
of regulation that Congress established for the broadcast industry. Having
recognized the need for regulation in this industry, Congress enacted the
Federal Communications Act of 1934, establishing the FCC and thereby
subjecting broadcasting to administrative authority.° Since Congress wanted
to insure that the field of broadcasting would remain competitive, it did not
authorize the Commission to exempt broadcasters from the scope of the anti-
trust laws.° Furthermore, antitrust cases heard before the Commission are
subject to scrutiny and initiation of court injunctive action by the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department. It is the purpose of this comment: (I )
to examine the "fundamental issues" raised in terms of FCC policy; and
(2) to consider the application of antitrust law to the proposed ITT-ABC
merger.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE PROPOSED ITT-ABC MERGER
ITT is a huge, international corporate conglomerate. It has business
interests in sixty-six foreign countries, from which it derives sixty per cent
of its total revenue.? The balance is chiefly derived from the domestic manu-
facture and sale of telecommunications and other electronic equipment to
the U.S. space and defense industries. Among its many holdings, ITT owns
Press Wireless, Inc., which provides complete news-wire service to sixty-five
foreign countries. It is currently negotiating to acquire Howard W. Sams &
Company, a major publisher and printer of magazines and textbooks. ITT's
enormous wealth approximates 2 billion dollars in total assets and 1.75
billion dollars in annual revenue.°
In 1943, when the FCC caused the National Broadcasting Company
(NBC) to divest itself of one of its two networks, 9 ABC was formed from
the divested facilities. In addition to its five television stations, six standard
whether the merger with UPT will stimulate competition and result in an
over-all improvement of network service; and (e) whether the merger will
lessen competition or tend to monopoly.
Id. at 315-16. The Commission has essentially covered the same areas with respect to the
proposed ITT-ABC merger, with less emphasis, however, on the history of network
broadcasting. This comment treats these areas as well as those factors normally con-
sidered in regard to transfer and assignment applications.
5
 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
6
 However, the power to exempt certain industries from the antitrust laws has
been conferred on other regulatory agencies, e.g., the Interstate Commerce Commission's
power to exempt common carriers under 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 5(2) (1964). Such power has also been given to the FCC in its regulation of so-called
common-carrier communicators, namely telephone and telegraph companies. '57 Stat. 5
(1943), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (1964).
7 Broadcasting, Sept. 26, 1966, p. 49.
8
 In the Matter of Applications by American Broadcasting Cos., Docket No.
16828, FCC—Memorandum Opinion and Order, Dec. 21, 1966, at 1 (Johnson, Comm'r,
dissenting) [hereinafter cited as Opinion Approving Transfer]; Broadcasting, Dec. 26,
1966, p. 21.
9
 Radio Corp. of America, 10 F.C.C. 212 (1943).
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broadcast (AM) stations, and six frequency modulation (FM) stations,
ABC controls a national radio network, a national television network, 400
motion picture theaters, and a major record company. ABC is a powerful
organization, but in relation to NBC and Columbia Broadcasting System
(CBS), the other two organizations controlling radio and television networks,
it is in the weakest competitive position. Its assets and revenue are sub-
stantially less than that of either CBS or NBC," and its 137 primary
television affiliates reach only 93.4 per cent of American homes, as compared
with 99 per cent for NBC's 206 affiliates and 99.2 per cent for CBS's 192
affiliates." This latter fact, while not appearing to demonstrate a signifi-
cantly inferior position, is of great importance to national advertisers (the
prime source of network income), who are concerned with reaching the
largest possible percentage of the viewing public.
The merger of ITT, now ranked thirtieth in the nation in terms of
corporate revenue, 12 with ABC would result in a corporation with assets and
annual revenue each approximating 2.3 billion dollars, twentieth in size in
the United States." ITT-ABC's broadcasting activities would account for
about thirteen per cent of the corporation's revenue."
Early in 1965, ITT, with a view toward increasing its domestic hold-
ings, initiated talks with ABC regarding the feasibility of a merger, and in
December 1965 the companies announced that they were considering this
matter. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department then commenced
an investigation into the possible anticompetitive consequences. The boards
of directors of ABC and ITT approved the merger in February 1966; the
required applications for transfer and assignment of ABC's seventeen
broadcast-station licenses were filed with the FCC in March 1966; and the
Commission then gave the required public notice of this filing." In April
1966, shareholders of both corporations approved the merger.
During the summer and fall of 1966, both the Justice Department and
the FCC continued their separate investigations into the legality of the
proposed merger. Sharp disagreement among the FCC commissioners as to
the procedure to be employed in considering the merger first came to light
when two of the commissioners dissented from a majority request made to
ITT and ABC for additional information. They dissented on the ground
that this information, in combination with that contained in the applications,
10	 1965 Assets*	 1965 Revenues*
	ABC263.0	 476.0
CBS 7
	
469.0	 00.0
RCA/NBC	 1,269.0	 2,057.0
* In millions of dollars
These figures are approximate and are drawn from Broadcasting, Dec. 26, 1966, p. 21.
11 Broadcasting, Sept. 26, 1966, P. 52.
12 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 1 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
13 Broadcasting, Dec. 26, 1966, p. 21.
14 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 2 (Bartley, Comm'r, dissenting).
15 The filing of applications for transfer must be duly publicized. 48 Stat. 1086
(1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 311(a) (1964). Such publication must be broadcast
over each station involved and printed in newspapers of general circulation in each city
in which one of the stations is located. 47 C.F.R. § 1.580 (1966).
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was inadequate to constitute the full record, as the majority of commissioners
intended it should. The dissenters felt that the merger was of such "far-
reaching political, social and economic consequences for the public interest,"
that the record upon which this merger was to be considered should be
compiled through the medium of an evidentiary hearing." Section 309(e)
of the Federal Communications Act and section 1.593 of the FCC regula-
tions require a full evidentiary hearing if the applications or other matters
the Commission may have chosen to notice present "a substantial and ma-
terial question of fact."17 The majority, however, felt that there were no
such questions and that, therefore, a full hearing was not necessary. Their
opinion was reinforced by the fact that no interested or adverse parties had
come forth to raise any questions or to challenge the proposed merger." In
August 1966, the majority of FCC commissioners, in what was ostensibly
an attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to appease the disSenters, ordered an oral
hearing on the merger before the Commission en banc. The overall purpose
of this rather unorthodox procedure was to air the "legal and policy issues
of substance and significance" and, additionally, to allow for direct question-
ing of the applicants." The Commission preserved the right of any interested
party to raise questions of fact during the oral hearing. 2°
At the hearing, conducted on September 19 and 20, no interested or
adverse parties appeared. The only testimony came from Messrs. Goldenson
and Geneen, presidents of ABC and ITT respectively, and from Mr. John
McCone, a director of ITT. The FCC asked for and received from both
parties assurances to the effect (1) that ABC was in need of financial as-
sistance, (2) that it was not feasible to obtain such assistance through
further debt financing or a new stock issuance, (3) that ITT was committed
to support ABC's alleged financial needs, and (4) that ITT's foreign business
interests would not adversely influence the "objectivity" of ABC's news and
public-affairs programming. 21 The substance of these assurances created,
and remain, "public interest" issues in the present considerations.
In November 1966, the Justice Department requested the Commission
to defer judgment on transfer of the licenses until the Department had had
more time to complete its study of the antitrust consequences of the merger.
On December 20, the Department, believing that a determination by the
FCC was imminent, sent a letter to the Commission setting forth the
16 FCC, Public Notice, Report No. 6084 (July 21, 1966) (dissenting opinion).
17 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47• U.S.C. § 309(e) (1964). Sec 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.593 (1966).
18
 The licensee of radio station KOB at Albuquerque, New Mexico filed an opposi-
tion relating to his long-standing application for the frequency occupied by WABC in
New York City. The KOB opposition did not, however, raise any broad question or
factual issue concerning the merger plan as a whole, but rather an unrelated issue
which the Commission believed could be dealt with otherwise. In the Matter of Appli-
cations by American Broadcasting Cos., Docket No. 16828, FCC—Order and Notice of
Oral Hearing Before the Commission En Banc, Aug. 17, 1966, at 2.
10 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 10-14.
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following preliminary conclusions regarding the antitrust implications of the
merger:
(1) There are several anticompetitive consequences that may
possibly flow from an ITT-ABC merger, effects of which might
conceivably be substantial.
(2) The possibilities of such anticompetitive consequences
seem sufficiently speculative that we are not presently contemplating
an action under the antitrust laws to enjoin consummation of the
merger.
(3) On the other hand, we believe the possibilities of ad-
verse effects are significant enough that we should call them to your
attention, and that they deserve full and serious consideration by
the Commission in making its determination whether, in light of
these and other pertinent factors, the acquisition of ABC by ITT
would serve the public interest, convenience and necessity." 22
The Justice Department also set out six areas which it believed offered the
possibility of antitrust violations.
On the following day, December 21, the FCC, by a vote of 4 to 3, ap-
proved the transfer of stations, and, in effect, the merger." The FCC
majority found that: (I) the merger would eliminate no horizontal com-
petition; (2) the vertical (buyer-seller) relationships between ABC and ITT
were so small as to be insubstantial by any legal test; (3) there was no
evidence to indicate that the merger would afford either company an op-
portunity to use the economic power of the other to secure any significant
purchases by reciprocity; (4) ITT's larger financial resources would
strengthen ABC's capacity to compete effectively; (5) the merger promised
meaningful enhancement of ABC's network and station programming services
in that ABC would be able to present enlarged news and public-affairs
services, speedier conversion to color, and  substantial new facilities for
program production; and (6) ITT would undertake to promote the advance-
ment of UHF broadcasting. 24
Three commissioners dissented, primarily because of the brevity of
the FCC's hearing, the Commission's reliance on the representations and
assurances of ABC and ITT as the sole factual record upon which approval
was granted, and the size of ITT, its foreign holdings, and, as they envisioned
it, the adverse influence this would have on ABC's dissemination of news
and public-affairs information."
The Justice Department now maintains that the Commission failed to
consider several possible anticompetitive consequences which had been
pointed out in the Department's letter of December 20. 20
 In reply, ABC
22 Letter From Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney-General for the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department, to the FCC, Dec. 20, 1966, at 1.
28 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8.
24 Ibid.
25 Id. (dissenting opinions).
26 In the Matter of Applications by American Broadcasting Cos., Docket No. 16828,
FCC—Petition of the Department of Justice for Reconsideration and for Leave to Inter-
vene, Jan. 18, 1967 [hereinafter cited as Petition for Reconsideration].
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and ITT argue that the FCC had fully considered all issues raised by the
Antitrust Division, and had found that the anticompetitive consequences
were too speculative to be of concern.27 They further point out that the FCC
determined that the merger, rather than lessening competition, would promote
competition between the three major networks.
After FCC approval was granted, and two days before the merger was
to become effective, the Justice Department filed with the FCC a Petition
for Reconsideration and Leave to Intervene. This was followed by a series
of replies and counter-replies by ITT, ABC, and the Justice Department. 28
At the time of this writing, the FCC has yielded to the Department, has
reopened the considerations, and has commenced a hearing, permitting the
Department, to intervene as an interested party.
III. "PUBLIC INTEREST, CONVENIENCE, AND NECESSITY" UNDER THE
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT
Consideration of the FCC's proper function in acting on transfer and
assignment applications requires a clear understanding of the nature of the
standard under which the Commission operates. Congress, in Section 310(b)
of the Federal Communications Act stated that:
No . . . station license . . . shall be transferred, assigned,
or disposed of in any manner . . . by transfer of control of any
corporation holding such . . . license . . except upon applica-
tion to the Commission and upon finding by the Commission that
the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served
thereby."
In determining what the "public interest" entails and what requirements
must be met by an applicant in demonstrating that approval of his applica-
tion will serve the public interest, section 308(b) of the act provides some
initial guidance. This section stipulates that:
All applications • • . shall set forth such facts as the Commis-
sion by regulation may prescribe as to the citizenship, character,
and financial, technical, and other qualifications of the applicant
to operate the station . . . and such other information as [the
Commission] ... may require."
27 Id,—Opposition of American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. and International Tele-
phone & Telegraph Corporation to Petition of the Department of Justice for Reconsidera-
tion and for Leave to Intervene, Jan. 26, 1967 [hereinafter cited as Opposition of ABC
and ITT to Reconsideration].
28 Ibid; id.—Reply of Department of Justice, Jan. 30, 1967 [hereinafter cited as
Reply]; id.—Specification of Issues and Evidentiary Material in Support of Petition for
Reconsideration by the Department of Justice, Feb. 15, 1967 [hereinafter cited as Speci-
fication of Issues and Evidentiary Matter]; id.—Statement of American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc. and International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation in Response to
Specification of Issues and Evidentiary Material in Support of Petition for Reconsidera-
tion by the Department of Justice, Feb. 23, 1967 [hereinafter cited as Response to
Specification]; id.—Rebuttal by the Department of Justice, Feb, 28, 1967 [hereinafter
cited as Rebuttal].
29 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1964).
30 47 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1964).
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The language of section 308(b), read in conjunction with section 310(b),
implies that citizenship, character, and financial and technical qualifications
must be met before a license can be granted. It does not imply, however, that
because an applicant meets these qualifications the grant of a license would
necessarily serve the public interest. More is needed, and may be provided
for by the language of section 308(b), which also stipulates that all applica-
tions shall set forth such facts as the Commission may prescribe as to "other
qualifications of the applicant" and, further, "such other information as the
Commission may require."3' A pertinent FCC regulation, section 1.591(a),
states that;
In the case of any application ... the Commission will make
the grant if it finds that the application presents no substantial and
material question of fact and meets the following requirements:
(1) There is not pending a mutually exclusive application
(2) The applicant is legally, technically, financially, and other-
wise qualified;
(3) The applicant is not in violation of provisions of law or
this chapter or established policies of the Commission; and
(4) A grant of the application would otherwise serve the
public interest, convenience, and necessity. 32
On the basis of the language of the statute and of the regulation, it can be
concluded that the FCC must determine, as a minimum, that the applicant
is qualified as to citizenship, character, financial soundness, and technical
ability. Thereafter, it becomes necessary for the Commission to decide
whether, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the satisfaction of
these requirements alone is enough to serve the public interest. If factors
beyond the minimum-requirement factors indicate the possibility of adverse
effects on the public interest, the Commission must consider these factors.
The public-interest standard, with which an applicant must comply, has
been referred to as the "touchstone" of FCC authority," and the Supreme
Court has defined it as the "supple instrument for the exercise of discretion
by the expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative
policy."34
 Since the public-interest criteria vary with the facts of each
case, the Commission must employ an ad hoc approach to each application."
But because the standard is so imprecise, it permits the Commission some
degree of discretion. A brief analysis of FCC and court holdings will disclose
what boundaries have been imposed on the FCC's exercise of discretion.
If a given case should involve a sole applicant for a new broadcasting
facility in an area currently not receiving any broadcast signal (a rare case
31 Ibid.
32 47 C.F.R. § 1.591(a) (1966) .
33 See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) ; FCC
v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
34 Ibid.
35
 McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Accord,
John Clarence Cook, 1 F.C.C.2d 1534, 1539 (1965).
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today, but frequent early in the FCC's existence), and the applicant has
satisfied the minimum requirements, the law would require that the FCC
grant the license on that basis alone,34 since almost any broadcast service
to such a community is in the public interest. When, however, a community
is receiving broadcasting service, an applicant may be required to do more
than merely meet the minimum requirements in order to satisfy the public-
interest standard. While the FCC and the courts still abide by a 1940
Supreme Court holding that "the broadcasting field is open to anyone,
provided there be an available frequency over which he can broadcast with-
out interference to others, if he shows his competency, the adequacy of his
equipment, and financial ability to make good use of the assigned channel," 37
the lessening of available broadcast facilities in recent years, and the fact
that almost all communities receive broadcast service from several stations,
has caused the Commission'to be more demanding.
The judiciary now supports the FCC's stricter standards. In 1949 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that, "if there be
only one applicant for a given frequency in a given area, the community
need for a new station and the relative ability, above the minimum require-
ments, of the applicant to render service are immaterial." 38 This decision
would seem to lose its validity in view of a 1962 decision by the same court
holding that the Commission may require that an applicant demonstrate an
earnest interest in serving a local community by evidencing a familiarity with
its particular needs, and that the Commission is not required to grant a license
merely because the sole applicant is legally, financially, and technically
qualified . 3°
When there are two or more applicants for a given facility, the Com-
mission, through a full hearing, makes what is known as a "comparative
consideration," and the scope of its discretion is significantly broadened. 4°
The Commission may find that all the applicants meet the minimum re-
quirements, and that all possess other qualities which would prove beneficial
to the public. Since approval of any one of the applications would serve the
public interest, the Commission must determine which potential licensee
as See, e,g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940). Accord,
Easton Publications Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
37
 FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, supra note 36, at 475.
38
 Easton Publications Co. v. FCC, supra note 36, at 346.
39
 Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962).
49
 Sec 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1964); 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.593 (1966). Also, if the Commission, in the case of a sole applicant, finds a substan-
tial and material question of fact, or should an interested party file a petition protesting
the granting of such license under 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309
(d) (I) (1964), in which case a hearing is also required, the scope of the FCC's inquiry
is significantly broadened. Neither the FCC's "review" function, nor its licensing function
under § 309, is performed merely by determining that the applicant is legally, technically,
and financially qualified to receive a grant of a broadcast license. Clarksburg Publishing
Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The Commission, on hearing of a protest
against the application of a broadcasting company, can consider any issue bearing on the
qualifications of the broadcast company or on the public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity. Philco Corp. v. FCC, 293 F.2d 864, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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would best serve the public interest. 41 This necessitates a comparative con-
sideration of many factors, e.g., awareness of public needs, owner-manage-
ment relationship, and the range of business or broadcast experience of
the applicants involved." The FCC weighs the positive and negative aspects
of each individual application, and then weighs one application against
another. Obviously, if none of the applicants would serve the public interest,
the Commission has a duty not to approve any of the applications."
Technically, the transferee/assignee applicant is a "sole applicant" in
that section 310(b) of the act stipulates, with respect to such an applica-
tion, that:
[Iin acting thereon the Commission may not consider whether the
public interest, convenience, and necessity might be served by the
transfer, assignment, or disposal of the ... license to a person other
than the proposed transferee or assignee.44
The legislative history of this clause states:
In other words, in applying the test of public interest, convenience,
and necessity the Commission must do so as though the proposed
transferee or assignee were applying for the . . . station license and
as though no other person were interested in securing such
.. license."
This statutory clause and its legislative history have caused some to draw
the conclusion that the Commission must accept the transferee-applicant
if he meets the minimum standards." While not necessarily illogical, this
conclusion is inaccurate. The clause merely prohibits the Commission from
considering any hypothetical applicants. The Commission is not limited to
a mere determination that the transferee, if granted a license, would serve
the public interest, but is required to determine whether the transfer itself
would serve the public interest. This requirement is set out in section 310(b)
which states that "no . . . license shall be transferred ... except upon . .
finding by the Commission that the public interest . . . will be served
thereby."'" (Emphasis added.)
41
 See Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 19.58).
42 FCC Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 395-
96 (1965); McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 35, at 19. See generally Hale
& Hale, Competition or Control II: Radio and Television Broadcasting, 107 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 585, 589-90 (1959).
43
 Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 289 F.2d 754 (1960).
44
 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1964).
45 2 U.S. Code Cong, & Ad. News 2246 (1952).
46
 Barrow, Network Broadcasting—The Report of the FCC Network Study Staff,
22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 611, 620 (1957).
47 Section 310(b) provides in full:
No construction permit or station license, or any rights thereunder, shall be
transferred, assigned, or disposed of in any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily,
directly or indirectly, or by transfer of control of any corporation holding such
permit or license, to any person except upon application to the Commission and
upon finding by the Commission that the public interest, convenience, and ne-
cessity will be served thereby. Any such application shall be disposed of as if the
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Although the transferee might be capable of serving the public interest,
he might not be as capable as the transferor (present licensee) and, therefore,
approval of the transfer could be adverse to the public interest. As a practical
matter, consideration of a transfer application should roughly parallel con-
siderations involved in comparative hearings. The Commission must compare
the qualities and characteristics of both the transferor and transferee. The
background, business expertise, broadcast experience, awareness of public
needs, and strengths and weaknesses of both will deserve consideration. The
past performance of the present licensee will have to be compared with the
prospective performance of the potential licensee. Therefore, though the
potential licensee is a sole applicant, the finding required of the Commission
literally forces it to make comparative considerations. It would appear, then,
that the transfer situation is something of a hybrid, involving elements of
both the "sole applicant" and the "comparative" cases.
In a transfer case, it appears that the scope of the Commission's dis-
cretion is limited only by the scope and complexity of the transaction in-
volved. When a case involves the transfer of a single station from one indi-
vidual to . another, the Commission's discretion may be rather limited. It
must proceed only far enough to find a benefit to the public and to be
assured that there are no significant adverse factors. When the transfer
involves the acquisition of seventeen radio and television stations and a
vast network empire by a powerful, international, corporate conglomerate,
the scope of the FCC's discretion should be almost without limit. An ac-
curate finding of where the public interest lies in such a situation cannot be
made without extensive consideration.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC-INTEREST STANDARD
A discussion of the public-interest factors involved in consideration of
the proposed ITT-ABC merger can be organized around subsections (2),
(3), and (4) of section 1.591(a) of the FCC regulations. 48 Subsection (2)
states the basic requirement that an applicant be qualified legally, financially,
and technically." The financial requirement is designed to insure that
the applicant is financially sound and has the necessary resources to operate
the station or stations applied for. The technical requirement simply demands
that the applicant demonstrate his ability to operate and maintain the
complex technical equipment associated with broadcasting. Neither should
present any significant problems for a major corporate applicant. 50 ITT is
not only financially sound, but is a giant in communications technology—a
proposed transferee or assignee were making application under section 308 of this
title for the permit or license in question; but in acting thereon the Commission
may not consider whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity might
be served by the transfer, assignment, or disposal of the permit or license to a
person other than the proposed transferee or assignee.
48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1964).
48 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.591(a)(2), (3), (4) (1966). This FCC rule derives from §§ 308(b)
and 310(b) of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1085, 1086, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 308(b), 310(b) (1964).
49 47 C.F.R. § 1.591(a) (2) (1966).
50
 If a major corporate applicant should have a great percentage of its monetary
resources tied up in financially unsound enterprises, or if it should have adversely dis-
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field closely related to broadcast technology. As will be pointed out later,
the combination of ITT's expertise in communications and ABC's expertise
in broadcasting could provide a substantial benefit to the public.
The "legal" requirement of regulation section 1.591(a) (2) deserves more
thorough consideration, as it can be of great significance to a corporate
applicant. In determining that an applicant is "legally" qualified, the FCC
considers two basic factors, namely, citizenship and character.51 The citizen-
ship requirement is stated in Section 310(a) of the Federal Communica-
tions Act, in terms of a command that:
The station license required shall not be granted to or held
by—
(1) Any alien or the representative of any alien;
(4) Any corporation of which any officer or director is an
alien or of which more than one-fifth of the capital
stock is owned of record or voted by aliens or their
representatives . . .52
Section 310(a) was drafted and included in the Communications Act of
1934 essentially because of congressional concern with ITT's world-wide
businesses and holdings. 53 Nevertheless, even though some of its stock is
held by aliens, ITT is not in violation of this section and, therefore, qualifies
with respect to the citizenship requirement. Possible violation of the spirit of
the alien law, however, raises some controversial public-interest considera-
tions which will be discussed later in regard to "licensee responsibility"
criteria.
The "character" requirement is rather unclear, and the FCC has not
attempted to define it. It is clear, however, that the Commission should con-
sider any facts and circumstances, within its knowledge, which indicate that
there may be a question as to the integrity of a person or persons in control
of a corporate applicant. The Commission is specifically concerned with
pending cases involving felony or other moral turpitude, 54 membership in
the Communist Party or other organizations which advocate the violent over-
throw of the Government, 55 persistent violations of the antitrust laws," and
proportionate debt obligations, financial requirements take on greater significance. If the
corporate applicant is not technically oriented, this problem can be overcome by the fact
that the applicant would, most likely, be acquiring the broadcast assets in toto, personnel
included, thereby retaining the technical expertise of the present licensee. If for any reason
this were not the case, the transferee applicant would have to demonstrate that it had
made provisions for securing the necessary operating and management personnel.
51 Consideration of these factors derives from the language in § 308(b) of the Fed-
eral Communications Act stipulating that "applications . . . shall set forth . . . facts
• . . as to the citizenship, character, and financial, technical and other qualifications of
the applicant." 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1964).
52 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(a) (1964).
53 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 9 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
64 See John Clarence Cook, supra note 35; Rockland Broadcasting Co., 36 F.C.C.
303, 315 (1964); Aladdin Radio & Television, Inc., 17 F.C.C. 989, 1017 (1953).
55 See Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147, 151 (1964).
56 See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra note 33, at 222-24; Hale &
Hale, supra note 42, at 590-91.
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false statements or misrepresentations in the material submitted by the ap-
plicant.57
 Should any one or more of these factors exist with respect to a
given corporate applicant, it is probable that the Commission will disqualify
the applicant for reasons of undesirable character. The Commission cannot,
however, give weight to the political, social, or economic views of the appli-
cant unless they manifest themselves in activities which would be detri-
mental to the public interest." Such manifestations and their significance
to public-interest considerations will also be discussed in connection with
licensee responsibility. There appears to be no question regarding the
integrity of ITT or of those who control it. ITT does not have a history of
persistent antitrust violations. For years ITT has been entrusted with
national-defense projects of a most sensitive nature, and its leaders are
recognized as men of extraordinary competence and integrity. 59
Section 1.591(a) (4) of the regulations is also important," since it re-
quires the FCC to carry its considerations beyond the minimum requirements
of subsection (2) and, by implication, allows the scope of such considerations
to vary depending on the facts and circumstances of each case." In general,
the considerations involved can be separated in three ways: (1) diversifica-
tion of opinion and program sources through the diversification of control
of mass-communication media (the noneconomic corollary to the theory of
promotion of competition); (2) licensee responsibility; and (3) promotion
of competition (to be discussed in detail in a subsequent section of this
comment) . 62
A. Diversification of Opinion and Program Sources
Section 303(g) of the Federal Communications Act reflects Congress'
belief that the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" require "the
larger and more effective use" of broadcasting facilities." This, and the
57
 See FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1946); Robinson v. FCC,
334 F.2d 534, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
58
 See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra note 33, at 226.
58
 ITT developed and installed the President's "hot line." It also played a major role
in the establishment of the DEW Line (Distant Early Warning Line), and in the develop-
ment of allied-forces communications. See Broadcasting, Nov. 21, 1966, p. 42.
00
 Section 1.591(a) (3) of the FCC rules, requiring that the applicant not be in viola-
tion of any law or of any policy of the Commission, appears to be merely an extension of
the legal requirement of subsection (2).
61 This subsection requires the Commission to grant a license if it "would otherwise
serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity." (Emphasis added.) This essentially
allows—in fact directs—the Commission to conduct further inquiry with respect to any
and all issues raised by a given application and by other information in its possession,
until it is assured that the public interest will be served.
62 See Barrow, supra note 46, at 614.
63 Section 303(g) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to
time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall—
(g) Study new uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies,
and generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public
interest . .
48 Stat. 1082 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1964).
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philosophy behind the fundamental concept of free speech, has resulted in
the FCC's establishment of the "diversification of opinion and program
sources" as a public-interest criterion. The courts, also, agree that the
"widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public . . . "64 The public is to be
protected from dependence upon a monopolistic source, or narrow group of
sources, for its day-to-day programming and, especially, for its news and
public-affairs programming." Thus, to increase diversification, the FCC
generally permits entry into the broadcast industry by as many licensees
as is consistent with technical limitations. This is done through its applica-
tion of multiple-ownership rules, through its preference for an applicant
not in control of other forms of mass-communication media, and through
its promotion of the further development and growth of broadcast facilities,
such as UHF.
1. Multiple-Ownership Rules. "Multiple ownership" refers to owner-
ship of more than one broadcast facility of a given kind, e.g., AM, FM, or
television. The FCC has ruled that certain forms of multiple ownership
may be contrary to the public interest, and has adopted express regulations
limiting such ownership." No license will be granted for a given type of
broadcast station if the applicant owns, operates, or controls another such
station which would overlap in coverage. Also, if any stockholder, officer, or
director of the applicant is an officer or director of any other such type
of broadcast station, and if this circumstance would result in a concentration
of control adverse to the public interest, no license will be granted." In
any event, the Commission will always consider it adverse to the public
interest for any licensee to have a direct or indirect interest in more than
seven broadcast facilities of the same type. 68
The multiple-ownership rules are directly applicable to the acquisition
of broadcast facilities by a corporate applicant. If a corporation, already
in control of a station or stations, applies to the FCC to acquire an additional
station or stations of the same kind, the Commission will have to determine
whether overlap of coverage exists, whether the regulatory allowances will
be exceeded, and, even if they will not be exceeded, whether the concentra-
tion produced by the inclusion of additional similar stations under the in-
fluence of one organization will be adverse to the public interest. The same
84 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
65 See McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 35, at 16 n.2, 17. Accord,
Pacifica Foundation, supra note 55, at 151.
00 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.240, .35, ,636 (1966).
67
 The term "control" is not limited to majority stock ownership, but includes any
manner of actual working control. 47 §§ 73.240 n.1, .35 n.1, .636 n.1 (1966). In
considering whether control of broadcast facilities is so concentrated as to be detrimental
to the public interest, attention will be directed to the facts of each case with particular
reference to such factors as the size and location of the areas served, the number
of people served, and the extent of other competitive service in the arca.
68
 With respect to television stations, while the maximum number that any one
licensee can own is seven, only five of those can be VHF stations. 47 C.F.R. § 73.636
(a)(2) (1966). The multiple-ownership rules regarding FM and television stations are
not applicable to noncommercial educational stations. 47 C.F.R. § 73.240(b) (1966)
(FM); 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(b) (1966) (television).
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principles would apply to a corporation not currently controlling any
facilities, but desiring to acquire more than one of a given kind.
Multiple ownership of nonoverlapping stations does have a positive
public-interest aspect. Multiple owners generally have greater broadcasting
experience and larger financial resources, which will aid in the production of
higher quality programming. Because of this, the Commission must fre-
quently weigh the "experience" factor against the "diversification" factor.
It is always difficult to establish trends in the FCC's emphasis of various
public-interest criteria because of the ad hoc nature of their considerations.
Realistically, it is only possible to state that certain factors have become
public-interest criteria and have received varied weight depending on the
facts and circumstances surrounding the application." It seems, regarding
the "experience" and "diversification" factors, that the need for competent
programming, and the high percentage of single-station ownership that
existed for many years, caused the FCC to give the "experience" factor
equal or greater weight than the "diversification," or concentration-of-control,
factor.7° In recent years, however, the instances of multiple ownership have
increased rapidly,71
 and the quality of programming has generally improved.
It is submitted that the Commission's concern with the present high
percentage of commonly owned stations, and with the possible adverse in-
fluences on the public interest of such pervasive multiple ownership, is being,
and will continue to be, reflected in decisions which allow the "diversifica-
tion" factor to outweigh the "experience" factor." Corporations desiring
acquisition of more than one facility of a given kind are, therefore, liable
to find the Commission's tests more demanding and their approval less fre-
quent. Of course, if a corporate applicant can demonstrate that a transfer
and/or assignment will probably result in a substantial increase in experience,
or in resources capable of purchasing such experience, this will still count
heavily in favor of application approval.
ABC, now owning and operating five VHF television, six AM, and six
FM stations, is within the regulatory allowances prescribed by the multiple-
ownership rules. ITT, as a corporate entity, neither owns nor controls any
commercial broadcast facilities of any kind. An ITT-ABC merger, there-
fore, would appear not to violate the regulations. In the FCC's majority
opinion originally granting approval of this transfer, no mention was made
of the applicability of the multiple-ownership rules." This is quite probably
due to the fact that the FCC found no infringements. It would, of course,
have been necessary for the Commission to go beyond a summary considera-
tion of the apparent extent of multiple ownership mentioned above. In order
to insure against any possible violation, the Commission would have had to
an See Huntley, Growing Pains in Broadcast Regulation, 14 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
186, 193 (1957).
7 ° Note the differing viewpoints regarding the relationship between the "experience"
and "diversification" factors as expressed in the McClatchy opinion, supra note 35. See
also Tennessee Television, Inc. v. FCC, 262 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
71 See Channel 2 Corp., 2 F.C.C.2d 453 (1966).
72
 See FCC Policy on Comparative Hearings, supra note 42, at 394-95.
73
 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8.
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determine if any officer or director of ITT, or any one of the fifty largest
stockholders of ITT "owns, operates, controls, or has any interest in" any
broadcast facility not presently controlled by ABC." Had the Commission
found such an interest, and if it was sufficient to result in ITT-ABC having
an interest in more stations than the regulations allow, the FCC would nec-
essarily have found such a concentration adverse to the public interest.7
Should the Commission have found such an interest which, in combination
with the ABC holdings, did not exceed the allowances, it would still have
been required to determine the relative size of the interested party's holdings
in ITT and the nature and extent of his interests in broadcast facilities.76
This would have allowed an assessment of the increase in concentration of
control and, in turn, the adversity, if any, to the public interest. It is reason-
able to suppose that a person's interests in ITT and in the broadcast facil-
ities would have to have been significant in order to produce disapproval by
the Commission.
2. Preference for an Applicant Not Involved in Other Forms of Mass-
Communication Media. As between two or more applicants for a given li-
cense, the FCC tends to prefer the one who does not control other forms of
mass-communication media, such as a newspaper business or other types of
commercial broadcast facilities. 77 This is not a matter of express regulation,
but rather one of policy designed to provide additional means of insuring
that the dissemination of fact and opinion will remain diversified. The "pref-
erence" principle is generally employed only in comparative considerations,
and is probably outside the allowable scope of FCC inquiry when a sole
applicant desires an available broadcast station. 78 In a transfer situation,
and especially one involving the transfer of several facilities, the FCC should
be free to use this principle along with other public-interest criteria in order
to determine whether to permit the transfer.
The Commission has never denied approval of an application solely
because the applicant controlled other forms of mass-communication media.
The fact of such ownership is only one consideration the Commission uses
to determine who would better serve the public interest." The FCC has
stated that:
Aside from the specific question of common ownership of news-
papers and radio stations, the Commission recognizes the serious
74 47 C.F.R. § 73.35(b) & nn.1 & 2 (1966) ; 47 C.F.R. § 73.240(a) (2) & nn.1 & 2
(1966); 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(a) (2) & nn.1 & 2 (1966).
75 Supra note 74.
76 Ibid.
77 See, e.g., McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 3.5; Clarksburg Pub-
lishing Co. v. FCC, supra note 40, at 517-19. See generally Hale & Hale, supra note 42,
at 598-602.
78 In other words, if a sole applicant meets the minimum requirements and would
otherwise serve the public interest, the fact that he has substantial holdings in, or control
of newspaper businesses or other types of mass-communication media will not be grounds
for denial of the license sought. If that same applicant were opposed by an equally qual-
ified applicant without such other communication interests, the fact that the former had
such holdings or control would carry significant weight.
76
 McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 35, at 18-19.
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problems involved in the broader field of the control of the media
of mass communications and the importance of avoiding monopoly
of the avenues of communication of fact and opinion to the public.
All the Commissioners agree to the general principle that diversi-
fication of control of such media is desirable. The Commission does
not desire to discourage legally qualified persons from applying for
licenses, but does desire to encourage the maximum number of
qualified persons to enter the field of mass communication, and to
permit them to use all modern inventions and improvements in the
art to insure good public service. 80
Although the courts have never prohibited the FCC from taking note
of the fact that an applicant owns some other form of mass-communication
media, or from weighing this fact along with others in considering the public
interest, the courts did display an early concern with this policy and warned
the FCC not to promulgate rules unduly discriminating against such appli-
cants. In Stahlman v. FCC, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia considered a proposed FCC investigation into the policies the Com-
mission should follow respecting newspaper-owning applicants for broadcast
licenses. The court stated that the public-interest standard
should not be extended by implication to embrace a ban on news-
papers as such, for in that case it would follow that the power to
exclude exists also as to schools and churches; and if to these, the
interdict might be applied wherever the Commission chose to
apply it."
As the number of available broadcast facilities has diminished, and
concentration of operating facilities has increased, the courts have given
stronger support to this FCC "preference" policy. In upholding the FCC's
denial of a license to a major newspaper-owning applicant on the basis of
"preference," the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Mc-
Clatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, held that:
[T]he Commission is entitled to consider diversification of control
in connection with all other relevant facts and to attach such sig-
nificance to it as its judgment dictates.
This does not mean that the owner of a newspaper is disqual-
ified as a licensee. . . . But it does mean that the Commission is
free to let diversification of control of communications facilities
turn the balance . . . . 82
A finding by the Commission that the approval of a transfer would
result in a concentration of control adverse to the public interest will not
necessarily be fatal to the applicant. It will, however, be difficult to over-
come, and the applicant will have to demonstrate that substantial public-
88
 FCC Notice, Newspaper Ownership of Radio Stations, 9 Fed. Reg. 702, 703
(1944).
81
 126 F.2d 124, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
82
 239 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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interest benefits will be derived from the transfer in order to cause the bal-
ance to weigh favorably.s 3
As with the multiple-ownership rules, an applicant's ownership of some
other media for mass communication frequently means that the applicant
is experienced in assessing public needs and in providing for those needs. The
FCC will typically compare the experience of the transferor and transferee
in this area.
It is difficult to determine whether the transfer of ABC's licenses to
ITT would serve the public interest, since there are few specific, well-defined
"preference" considerations. ITT is a major communications company, but
this is not the same as saying that it is in control of mass-communication
media." There is some question, however, as to whether two of ITT's
present interests might endow it with such control. ITT's acquisition of
Howard W. Sams & Company, a publisher of magazines, manuals, and text-
books of a technical and professional nature, appears imminent. If this occurs,
ITT will have acquired a medium of mass communication, although it is one
presently limited in scope. Because of the specialized nature of the materials
Sams publishes, contact with the public is not extensive. Moreover, the con-
tent of the material is not that with which the principle of diversification is
primarily concerned, i.e., news and public affairs. This ITT subsidiary would
remain, however, a medium for mass communication, and the nature and
extent of its operation would be susceptible to alteration and expansion by
ITT.
In addition, there is Press Wireless, Inc., a recent acquisition of ITT.
Although it is a telecommunications rather than a broadcast facility, there
is the possibility that this operation could readily become the center of wide-
spread news and public-affairs dissemination. This subsidiary currently oper-
ates as a news-wire service to sixty-five foreign countries, and has reception
facilities in the United States. While ITT employees do not collect or report
the news information disseminated via this service, they are responsible for
its communication. If ITT acquires the broadcast equipment and expertise
83 If the transferor licensee, himself, owns other mass-communication media, or if
his programming is narrowly restricted in content due to other interests or a lack of
perception of public needs, the Commission could determine that approval of a transfer
to a sophisticated, newspaper-owning, corporate applicant would actually result in a
further diversification of fact and opinion sources. As a practical matter, however, such
an applicant has a heavy burden which will be directly proportional to the geographical
concentration of the applicant's present interests and the facility or facilities it wishes to
acquire. The number of newspapers and broadcast stations competing with him is a
factor which would carry great weight. -
84 The difference between being in the communications industry as a "common car-
rier," as is ITT, and being in the business of mass communication through broadcasting,
as is ABC, is illustrated by § 153(h) of the Federal Communications Act, which states
that:
"Common carrier" . . . means any person engaged .. . in interstate or
foreign communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio trans-
mission of energy ... but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not .. .
be deemed a common carrier.
48 Stat. 1066 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1964). Another subsection of the act defines
broadcasting as "the dissemination of radio communications intended to be received by
the public . . . ." (Emphasis added.) 48 Stat. 1066 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1964).
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of ABC, the function of Press Wireless could be adapted to serve not only
as a means of transmitting news from the foreign correspondent to his news-
paper or broadcast newsroom, but also as a center for news programming to
be utilized by ABC and other persons or concerns engaged in the business
of news dissemination. This possibility and the resultant increase in the con-
centration of news sources should be considered by the FCC as factors in-
volving the public interest.
Although the common ownership of Howard W. Sams and Press Wire-
less is not in itself adverse to the public interest, when placed in combination
with ABC's broadcast stations, radio and television networks, motion pic-
ture theaters, and record company, a potential harm to the public interest
may exist. It would seem that even a slight increase, through an ITT-ABC
merger, in the number of mass-communication media presently controlled by
ABC, would be considered adverse to the public interest.
In applying the preference policy to the proposed ITT-ABC merger,
the FCC must be careful not to limit itself to narrowly defined considera-
tions applied in other Iess significant situations. Most importantly, an analysis
of the transfer involved and its effect on the public interest must be con-
ducted in terms of the spirit of the preference policy. The FCC's opinion
of December 20, 1966, delivered in its original approval of the transfer
applications, stated that:
[I] t does not appear fair or proper to forbid the merger of ABC
and ITT because of rather vague fears of potential evils of size. . . .
[A]pproval of this merger will not increase the concentration of
broadcast holdings in any way. The structure of broadcasting will
be the same after this merger as it was before it, except for the addi-
tional strength that will accrue to ABC as a network . . . . 8 .5
Based on what has been discussed in this and the multiple-ownership sec-
tions, the Commission's conclusion, as far as it goes, is quite probably accu-
rate. The Commission has, however, limited its discussion to the concentra-
tion of broadcast holdings, and has not spoken in terms of concentration of
mass-communication media in general. Its statement with respect to broad-
cast holdings may indicate that the Commission did not make a more com-
prehensive consideration regarding concentration or, that it did, but found
no relevant problems.
The fact that ITT is involved in the telecommunications industry rather
than in the broadcast industry should not automatically preclude considera-
tion of the possibility of ITT's telecommunications business being a catalyst
for the creation of greater concentration of control of program sources when
combined with ABC. The combination of telecommunication assets and ex-
pertise with a major broadcast network has potential for providing new means
of disseminating fact and opinion not presently available to either ABC or
ITT individually. Of course, many of the effects which would result from
the combined activities of ITT and ABC are speculative. Others, however,
are susceptible of fairly accurate analysis through the exercise of FCC exper-
85
 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 12.
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tise. Any findings based on speculation are certainly not entitled to equal
weight with more concrete determinations.
On the other hand, one commissioner, dissenting from the FCC's major-
ity opinion of December 20, raised an interesting point which deserves brief
discussion. In rejecting the majority's finding that the structure of the broad-
cast industry would be the same after the transfer, this commissioner stated
that:
The structure will be changed substantially because the ABC opera-
tions, owned stations, radio network, and television network will be
meshed into a corporate conglomerate which changes the diversity
of control factor noticeably. Presently there is one TV network
owned by a corporate conglomerate. This merger would make two.
Bankers think like bankers.
And corporate conglomerates think like corporate conglom-
erates. One less factor of diversity would result from the merger. 86
The commissioner appears to be saying that since "conglomerates think like
conglomerates," approval of the merger will effectively reduce the number of
television networks controlled by differing entities from three to two: CBS
will retain its identity, but RCA-NBC and ITT-ABC will think alike, and
the result will be the same as if both were controlled by one organization.
This is a rather original argument, but one with which it is hard to agree.
In practice, there is probably very little difference in the way three power-
ful, public-conscious, competition-minded television networks "think." ABC
thinks like NBC which thinks like CBS. 87 To include ABC within the ITT
conglomerate would not alter this situation in a significant manner and,
therefore, would not result in a lessening of diversity of control.
Thus, it is submitted that the FCC has apparently limited the scope of
its inquiry regarding concentration of control to that which will result within
the ambit of existing broadcast facilities. If the Commission has so limited
itself, it has neglected the comprehensive nature of the "preference" principle,
a significant guidepost which it established to aid itself in determining the
effect of a transfer on the diversification of fact and opinion and, in turn,
on the public interest.
3. Encouragement of Further Development of Broadcasting Tech-
niques. The diversification policy of the FCC, and the stipulation in the
Federal Communications Act that the FCC shall study new uses for broad-
casting and provide for experimental uses of frequencies, 88 have caused the
Commission to investigate and encourage technological development in the
broadcast industry." Such development is needed to provide more outlets
for the dissemination of fact and opinion. The consequences of the ITT-
88 Id. at 11 (Bartley, Comm'r, dissenting).
87 ABC, CBS, and RCA-NBC are all concerned with a national market—the same
public and the same sponsors—and are likely, therefore, to approach the art of network
broadcasting in similar fashion. Sound business policy will not permit radical divergence
of thought in this respect.
88 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1964).
88 See Connecticut Comm. Against Pay TV v. FCC, 301 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1%2).
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ABC merger on ITT's technological investment in broadcast communica-
tions advancement has been a very controversial factor. If any corporate
application for transfer and acquisition of broadcast facilities indicated the
possibility that approval would have an adverse effect on the expansion of
broadcasting facilities, the FCC, acting in the public interest, would be com-
pelled to examine such possibilities thoroughly.
At the present time, the United States has essentially reached the point
where major expansion of VHF television broadcast facilities is technically
impossible due, primarily, to overlap of signal. However, the development of
UHF broadcasting has provided additional outlets, and will promote the
diversification of control of broadcasting facilities. Such diversification will
not result, however, until UHF becomes better able to compete with VHF.
Such competition has proved particularly difficult when the two have been
geographically contiguous or, in other words, integrated to serve the same area.
The UHF station owners experience economic difficulty which results from
the widespread ownership of solely VHF receiving sets and the consequent
loss, by UHF to VHF stations, of network affiliation and remunerative com-
mercial contracts. The FCC has attempted to improve the UHF competitive
position through experimentation with concepts such as "deintermixture.”°°
This concept calls for the nonintegration of UHF and VHF stations in a
given area. Where reasonable, and generally in areas which are not considered
major television markets, the FCC will limit television broadcast facilities
to either VHF or UHF. The Commission has never been happy with the
deintermixture concept, however," and has preferred, with few exceptions,° 2
to rely on the current requirement that all manufacturers of television sets
include UHF reception equipment. 9" As more and more viewers obtain VHF-
UHF receiving sets, the deintermixture concept can be abandoned.
Another means of expanding the number of broadcast facilities, though
still in its infancy, is through the community-antenna television system
(CATV). This system picks up signals from VHF and UHF transmitters
and relays them via cables to home receiving sets. CATV is primarily used
to bring metropolitan television to rural areas serviced only by local stations
and, more importantly, to remote areas outside the range of any television
transmitters. At the present time, the FCC does not consider this system to
be competitive with the established television broadcast systems, because
CATV operators merely relay regular television signals and do not originate
any of their own programming. This system would seem to have the potential,
00 See Greylock Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 231 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Coastal Bend Television Co. v. FCC, 231 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
91
 See Triangle Publications, Inc., 37 F.C.C. 307, 320-21 (1964); Evansville Tele-
vision, Inc., 36 F.C.C. 1387 (1964).
92 Id. at 1389.
93 76 Stat. 150 (1962), 47 U.S.C. § 303(s) (1964). The FCC rule adopted in con-
nection with § 303(s) states, in part, that
all television broadcast receivers manufactured after April 30, 1964, and shipped
in interstate commerce or imported from any foreign country into the United
States, for sale or resale to the public, shall be capable of adequately receiving
all channels allocated by the Commission to the television broadcast service.
47 C.F.R. § 15.65(a) (1966).
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however, to produce its own programming, and, when it does, it will assume
a competitive role.
In addition to UHF and CATV, there is development in the space-age
realm of communications, illustrated by the communications satellite. Since
this communications field is still in the experimental stages, it is difficult to
determine exactly how it will affect the diversification question. It is obvious,
however, that further development in UHF, CATV, and satellite communica-
tions will be required in order to further the diversification of opinion and
program sources.
The Justice Department has cited ITT's great technological expertise
and its substantial investment in communications technology as a major fac-
tor to be considered by the FCC when acting on the transfer application.
The Department contends that merger approval may cause ITT to discon-
tinue much of its investment in UHF and CATV. In support of its conten-
tion, the Department first cites the cessation of ITT's experimentation in
CATV early in the merger talks with ABC. Second the Department sug-
gests that ITT will not wish to invest further in the development of UHF,
as this will increase entry of competitors by making available additional
broadcast facilities, thereby harming ABC's competitive position. The Justice
Department points out that, in general, ITT's investment in ABC will with-
draw funds otherwise destined for technological advances. 94
ABC and ITT reply that the latter's current lack of interest in the
CATV program is totally unrelated to the proposed merger, and even were
it not, the inability of CATV to provide original programming should remove
CATV as a diversification factor. They point out that one of ABC's major
weaknesses, with respect to NBC and CBS, is its numerically inferior affilia-
tion status, and rather than cause ITT to withdraw from UHF development,
the merger will prompt ITT to further such development with the hope of
acquiring new UHF stations as affiliates. ABC and ITT further contend that
any withdrawal by ITT from participation in technological advancement
could only be self-defeating, for in a highly competitive world of swift tech-
nological change, no one involved in technology can afford not to participate
in its advancement. 96
 The majority of FCC commissioners have agreed with
these arguments.96
Inherent in the realization of further diversification of opinion and
program sources is the entry of new broadcasters into the industry. 07 The
ability to enter the broadcast industry and the probability of further entry
is effected by many of the previously mentioned factors, such as frequency
availability, multiple ownership, and development of new broadcast facilities.
In addition to the problem of entry of individual station broadcasters,
54
 See Letter from Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney-General for the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department, to the FCC, Dec, 20, 1966; Petition for Reconsidera-
tion, supra note 26; Reply, supra note 28; Specification of Issues and Evidentiary Matter,
supra note 28; Rebuttal, supra note 28.
55
 Sec Oppositiort of ABC and ITT to Reconsideration, supra note 27; Response to
Specification, supra note 28.
55
 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8.
57
 See Barrow, Network Broadcasting—The Report of the FCC Network Study Staff,
22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 611, 614 (1957).
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there is the problem of introducing more network organizations. Because
there are only three major television networks and four radio networks, the
entry of another fully competitive network, especially a television network,
would be very much in the public interest. If a merger, such as that between
ITT and ABC, were to lessen the opportunity for such entry, it would clearly
be adverse to the public interest, and the FCC would almost certainly be
compelled to deny approval of the transfer applications involved. It is sub-
mitted, however, that before considering the effect of a merger on creation
of another network, the Commission must consider the likelihood that another
network would appear. If entry prior to the transfer approval does not appear
feasible, can the Commission deny approval of transfer on the ground that
it would probably lessen the opportunity for entry? The answer to that ques-
tion might depend upon anticipated developments which would tend to make
entry more feasible at some future time. Again, however, the Commission
must base its determination on reasonable probabilities, and cannot deny
approval of an application on the basis of speculation alone.
The present structure of the broadcast industry poses severe difficulties
for anyone desiring to enter on a network level. The network concept was
first put into practice by NBC in 1923, followed by CBS in 1926 and ABC
in 1943. In the twenty-four years since ABC entered the industry, there have
been no serious, full-scale network operations initiated by other organiza-
tions.°8
 Furthermore, the opportunity for network entry is far more grim
now than at any time in the past. ABC, CBS, and NBC currently have under
affiliation contracts nearly 100 per cent of the television stations in the top
50-100 geographical markets in the country." Networks rely largely on ad-
vertising fees which are received only because the network is able to gain
the attention of millions of American viewers.'" A new network, unable to
secure affiliates in the major markets of the country, would find it difficult
to remain in operation. If a corporate applicant seeking ownership of several
stations could demonstrate the financial and technical ability to use these
stations as the nucleus for a new network and, further, could demonstrate a
reasonable plan for carrying this out, the acquisition would almost certainly
09
 Occasionally, other networks are organized, e.g., the Sports Network and the
short-lived United Network. Generally they televise a particular type of program by
buying local station time on a national level with money received from backers and,
hopefully, sponsors. Substantial backing is required, and if the endeavor fails, a second
chance is usually not forthcoming. These networks generally neither own nor operate
stations of their own. With respect to network operations and the entry problem, sec
generally Hale & Hale, Competition or Control II: Radio and Television Broadcasting,
107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 585, 596-97, 607-12 (1959).
09
 Although most of the affiliates will not fill all of their broadcast time with pro-
grams of the network with which they are affiliated, a fourth network would probably
find that prime television time is generally not available since it has been contracted to
one of the three established television networks. In addition, the local stations are not
too enthusiastic about relinquishing a major portion of their nonprirrie time, which they
have probably reserved for programming of local interest.
100
 In 1965, NBC sold $542 million of broadcasting time to sponsors. This was an
11% increase over the prior year and meant that for the eighteenth consecutive year
NBC had attracted more national advertisers than any other network. RCA Ann. Rep.
(1965).
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be approved. However, until greater numbers of comparable broadcasting
facilities come into existence, the entry of a fourth television network, capable
of competing with ABC, CBS, and NBC, does not appear to be feasible. The
contentions of the Justice Department, ABC, and ITT, with respect to the
proposed merger's effect on the entry of a fourth television network, will be
dealt with in detail in the antitrust section of this comment.
E. Licensee Responsibility
Since there are only a limited number of broadcast facilities available
for the large number of persons and concerns that wish to obtain a broadcast
license, the FCC must employ a selective process in granting such licenses.
It follows that the broadcast licensee does not become such as a matter of
right, but as a matter of privilege. When the FCC grants a person or a con-
cern the privilege of operating a broadcast station, upon which many will
depend for entertainment, news, and public-affairs information, the licensee
serves as a trustee for the benefit of the public."' In requiring the licensee
to accept the positive responsibility of serving the community, 102
 the FCC
takes into consideration the applicant's awareness of community needs, the
likelihood that he will serve those needs, and any nonbroadcast activities
which influence the "objectivity" of his programming.'"
To determine the applicant's awareness of community needs, the FCC
generally looks to factors such as local residency, civic participation in the
community to be served, and any other circumstances or efforts of the appli-
cant which may demonstrate the extent to which he is familiar with the
community broadcast needs. 10" With respect to a large, diversified corporate
applicant, and especially when that applicant is attempting to obtain licenses
for several stations, "residency" and "civic participation" do not apply, and
the FCC must rely on other indications of the requisite awareness.
101
 Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers
Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950).
102 While the "responsibility" requirement bears some similarity to the "character"
requirement found in § 1.591(a) (2) of the FCC rules, it falls more appropriately within
§ 1.591(a) (4) as a separate and additional consideration to be made once the applicant
has satisfied the minimum requirements. This is at least true where the FCC is concerned
with a situation similar to that of the proposed ITT-ABC merger. Should the Commis-
sion, in a less complex situation, feel constrained to conduct its considerations within the
context of the "minimum requirements," it could consider many of the licensee-respon-
sibility factors by bringing them within the "character" requirement of § 1,591(a) (2).
101
 Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., supra note 101,
at 500.
104 It should be pointed out that while there may well be a difference between what
the public needs and what the public wants, the FCC generally makes no distinction.
There are some who would argue that the FCC should demand that the needs rather
than simply the desires of the public he served. Their goal may be a worthy one, but the
means would, almost necessarily, violate personal rights. In Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C.
147, 149 (1964), the FCC stated that its function was not to pass on the merits of the
programming, but, instead, was limited to assaying whether the licensee's programming
judgments were reasonably related to the public interest. Of course, the Commission,
through its selective processing of potential licensees, can indirectly promote program-
ming better designed to provide for the public needs.
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It is reasonable to assume that ABC, NBC, and CBS are too sophisti-
cated, in a business sense, to neglect the task of assessing the public's pro-
gramming needs or desires in areas where those broadcasters own and operate
stations. If nothing else, the exigencies of competition would seem to require
this constant awareness. It is possible that ITT's size and varied interests
could cause it to neglect the local public service now provided by ABC, but
such a possibility seems unlikely.105 The combination of competition, ABC's
continued control over the day-to-day broadcasting operations, ITT's busi-
ness acumen, and the profit motive would seem to militate against such a
result. With regard to network operations, the same principles apply. Because
of the need to attract national advertising, the networks make use of, and
rely heavily on, the various rating services in order to evaluate their pro-
gramming in terms of what the public desires. The broadcasting industry is,
after all, a commercial industry, and many of its decisions are based on this
criterion.
Once the Commission is satisfied that an applicant has an awareness
of the public's needs, it generally considers whether the applicant is likely
to satisfy those needs. In making such a determination, the FCC has looked
to the amount of direct personal participation that the licensee-owner will
contribute to managing the operation of his station or stations, his range of
business experience, his previous experience in the operation of broadcast
facilities, and his proposed programming. 1" These factors will aid the Com-
mission in assessing the probability that the applicant's programming will
be in the public interest.
With respect to a transfer, and especially with respect to a multi-station
transfer such as that involved in the proposed ITT-ABC merger, the "owner-
ship-management" factor is applicable, though not in the same way as in a
single-station licensing request by an individual. In the latter situation, the
FCC essentially demands that the applicant demonstrate that he will be the
party managing the operation of the station.'" Such control is obviously not
feasible when a large, diversified, corporate applicant acquires a broadcast
organization of several stations. In such a case, the FCC, realistically, can
do no more than require that the new corporate licensee maintain close super-
vision over the management and operation of the stations involved. It is
not difficult to imagine that a widely diversified corporate licensee could lose
touch with its broadcast facilities' daily operations, resulting in an adverse
effect on needed local programming. To prevent this, the Commission should
examine the proposed management structure of the new combination and the
101 The 1965 Annual Report of RCA indicates that this huge corporate conglom-
erate is aware of community needs: the report states that RCA's television-station divi-
sion has vigorously implemented a policy of community service tailored to locations
where NBC owns stations.
106 McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956); FCC Policy
Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 395-96 (1965) ; Hale &
Hale, supra note 98, at 589-90. In Simmons v. FCC, 169 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1948), the
court upheld the FCC's determination that the applicant, by indicating his plans to let
CBS use as much of his broadcast time as the network pleased, had demonstrated that he
was making no effort to service the community's needs.
107 FCC Policy on Comparative Hearings, supra note 106, at 395-96.
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qualifications of those individuals who have been designated to head the
broadcast subsidiary or division.
ITT has assured the Commission that ABC will remain substantially
autonomous in that the present ABC executives and staff will continue to
manage the station and network operations. To insure a close connection be-
tween ITT and ABC, there will be an interlocking directorate; 108 ITT man-
agement will make ultimate decisions only on overall policy. Thus, the FCC's
desire for directness and competence of control should be satisfied.
The FCC considers the applicant's "range of business experience" in
order to determine the existence of managerial expertise sufficient to insure
efficient and effective operation of a station. This consideration is more sig-
nificant with respect to a single person or small group of persons applying
for a station license than with respect to a major corporate applicant, which
would generally be presumed to have such expertise. A poor record of busi-
ness success, of course, would weigh heavily against the applicant's chances
of receiving a license grant. ITT's business success is a matter of common
knowledge, and would present no problems in this area.
The Commission also considers the applicant's previous broadcasting
experience as a factor in determining whether the public interest will be
served. However, it is unlikely that a lack of experience would weigh heavily
against the approval of the application. Like ITT, many corporate applicants
will have had no broadcasting experience, yet will retain the station and/or
network personnel or will demonstrate the intent to replace such personnel
with others equally or better qualified. Such a plan of action will, most
likely, not effect the public interest in either a positive or negative way.
If all public-interest considerations could be reduced to a common de-
nominator or listed under an ultimate objective, that denominator or objec-
tive would almost certainly be "programming." In the long run, the public
interest is most concerned with the material and information that is being
broadcast. The Federal Communications Act, the FCC's regulations, and
that agency's various public-interest criteria all converge on the ultimate goal
of providing the public with diverse and competent programming. It is not
surprising, then, that the Commission should consider directly the proposed
programming of the applicant. 1 "
In regard to a sole applicant for an available facility, the consideration
is generally limited to determining whether the applicant has "an earnest
interest" in assessing community needs."° In regard to an application for
license renewal, the Commission has a duty to consider the past performance
of an applicant in meeting the community's needs. 1" Past performance ap-
pears to be the best criterion for forecasting the quality of future perfor-
108 Leonard Goldenson, the President and Chairman of the Board of ABC, will sit
on ITT's Board of Directors and will be a member of that Board's Executive Committee.
Two other ABC executives will also serve on ITT's Board. Harold Geneen, ITT's Presi-
dent and Chairman of the Board, and two other ITT executives will serve on ABC's
Board of Directors. Broadcasting, Dec, 26, 1966, p. 21.
100
 FCC Policy on Comparative Hearings, supra note 106, at 397-98.
110 Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
ttl Pacifica Foundation, supra note 104, at 149. See Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534,
536 (D.C. Cir. 1964); FCC Policy on Comparative Hearings, supra note 106, at 398.
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mance. In regard to a comparative situation in which two or more parties
who are presently operating broadcast facilities apply for a broadcast license,
past performance would weigh positively or negatively only if it had been
unusually good or bad." 2 As a corollary, the Commission indicates that only
if there is a substantial and material difference between competing proposals
for future programming will the Commission count the assessment of planned
programming one way or the other.' 13 In a comparative consideration in-
volving an applicant who is presently operating other broadcast facilities and
a competing applicant who has not in the past operated broadcast facilities,
it can be implied that the Commission will consider the latter's proposed
programming and the former's past programming as well as any proposals
the former may have for improvement. The station-owning applicant would,
of course, be presenting his past record and his future capacity for producing
good programming in a light most favorable to acceptance of his application.
The transfer situation, such as that involving the proposed ITT-ABC
merger, requires special attention because of differences between it and situa-
tions allowing comparative consideration. With respect to applications for
transfer, at least one party, namely the transferor, will always be presently
involved in broadcasting. The station-owning transferor, obviously not com-
peting with the proposed transferee, but, on the contrary, desirous of FCC
acceptance of the acquiring corporation, will present its programming and
its capacity to continue competent programming in the worst possible light.
The transferor wishes to impress upon the Commission its need for the assis-
tance which a merger would provide. In such a case, it appears necessary for
the Commission to assess the past programming performance of the station-
owning transferor. If there are deficiencies, it should determine the cause of
such deficiencies, whether it be lack of sufficient monetary resources and/or
poor broadcasting management, and then it should determine whether or not
acquisition of such broadcast facilities by the proposed transferee would cure
these problems and result in improved programming.'" Should the Commis-
sion find that the transferor has a good record, it must still determine whether
the acquisition could further improve programming, since it is the transfer
which must serve the public interest. However, there is no need for the Com-
mission to require proof of substantial and material improvement. Because
of the noncompetitive position of the applicants and the more restricted scope
of examination in this "sole applicant" situation, the Commission should be
satisfied with finding that the merger would have the probable effect of im-
proving programming, thereby serving the public interest, convenience, and
necessity. 115
If a corporation, by acquiring a broadcast organization, could, through
the application of financial resources not presently available to that organiza-
tion, assist it in improving its programming, there would result a positive
benefit to the public. This would especially be true if the broadcast organiza-
tion was so financially weak that it could offer only programming that was
112 Ibid .
113 Id. at 397.
114 See Paramount Television Prods, Inc., 17 F.C.C. 264, 315-16 (1953).
111 See Response to Specification, supra note 28, at 6.
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somewhat inferior to that of competing broadcast companies. The public
benefit might be negated or at least lessened, however, should it appear that
other sources of financial assistance not involving merger, were available and
feasible. The proposed ITT-ABC merger has raised significant questions, and,
in turn, has produced heated controversy, with respect to such a considera-
tion.
One of the major reasons propounded by ABC and ITT as to why the
transfer of stations, and hence the merger, should be approved relates to
ABC's need for new capital, allegedly necessary to enhance its competitive
position with respect to NBC and CBS. 1" The majority of FCC commis-
sioners were convinced that ABC had proved its need for substantial financial
assistance and, being assured by ITT that it had committed itself to a com-
prehensive expansion program for ABC, felt that the transfer would offer to
the public the benefits of improved ABC programming and an improved
capacity for competition with NBC and CBS. These benefits were the prime
reasons for FCC approval of the merger. 117
The Justice Department and the dissenting commissioners, while not
doubting the veracity of ABC's financial statements, did not feel that they
justified a merger. 118
 It is quite apparent that ABC is not in grave financial
trouble, but rather that it is a profitable company with an excellent growth
rate. It is also apparent, however, that NBC and CBS each outstrip ABC in
terms of available resources, enabling them to modernize and expand their
facilities and programming with less strain on the budget. ABC has been
moderately successful in competing with NBC and CBS for ratings, affiliates,
and related advertising contracts,'" but there is no doubt that such success
has been expensive. These expenses account, to a large extent, for ABC's
small share of the industry's net broadcasting profits.
ABC, because of its size and the nature of its business, is subject to
great fluctuation in earnings and substantial dips in stock prices, which tend
to place "a restraining influence on management's ability to incur important
long-term commitments essential to program improvement and [tend] ... to
keep innovation, with its attendant high risks, at lower levels. ..." 12° Although
a lack of financial depth might certainly tend to keep innovation in pro-
gramming at a lower level over a long-term period, ABC has been a sub-
stantial innovator in recent years.i 2 E It has been suggested that ABC's weak
competitive position has been the motivating force behind such innovation. 122
This is probably correct, in that in order to attract more advertising, ABC
11a See Letter from Leonard H. Goldenson, President, ABC, to FCC, July 25, 1966.
For ABC and ITT's arguments and contentions regarding these needs, see documents flied
under FCC Docket No. 16828 referred to in notes 27 and 28 supra.
117 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 13.
118
 See Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 26, at 8; Specification of Issues and
Evidentiary Matter, supra note 28, at 19-23.
119
 Letter From Leonard H. Goldenson, supra note 116, at 4; Response to Specifica-
tion, supra note 28, at 32-33.
120
 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 40-41 (Johnson, Comm'r, dis-
senting).
121 Id. at 30-31 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
122
 Id. at 31 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
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essentially felt it necessary to invest in new and unique programming in an
attempt to capture a larger viewing audience. It could be further argued that
putting ABC on a financial par with NBC and with CBS will remove the
force which is presently motivating ABC to innovate, thereby causing harm
to the public interest. This, however, would seem to run contrary to logic
and good business sense. Access to a greater amount of capital will not neces-
sarily result in equal acceptance of ABC's programming by the public. In
order to attract the advertising ABC needs, it will still have to produce pro-
gramming which pleases the public. To accomplish this, continued innovation
is required. The increased financing would, in fact, allow ABC to take greater
risks in programming and to increase the proportion of unique programming.
In this way the transfer may serve to put ABC on a competitive par with
NBC and CBS, and in the meantime it should produce a benefit to the public
in terms of better programming.
The Commission's dissenters also contend that the merger would not in-
crease the number of ABC affiliates, which would be necessary to equalize
ABC's competitive position.' 23 Since a network cannot buy affiliates, the
merger would not provide a direct solution to this deficiency. Indirectly,
however, through the promotion of better programming, ABC could induce
its competitors' affiliates to switch over.
The dissenters are on more solid ground in asking whether the merger
is ABC's only solution to its problems. 124 If ABC could reasonably obtain
the needed funds through further debt financing or from a public issuance
of stock, and thereby carry out its complete color conversion, construction
projects, and programming policies, the merger with ITT, at least in respect
to these factors, would not weigh as heavily in the public interest. The FCC
has given much consideration to the benefits which merger with ITT would
bestow upon ABC in terms of financial assistance, 125 but it is not apparent
that the Commission has given such consideration to the feasibility of ABC's
obtaining the needed capital in other ways. Since this question is of such
significance to the transfer application, it is imperative that the Commission
fully investigate this matter.
C. The "Adverse Influence" Factor
One of the most important considerations to be made with respect to
the proposed ITT-ABC merger is the effect of ITT's various nonbroadcast
interests on ABC's news and public-affairs programming. The phrase "non-
broadcast interests" can refer to any activities of an applicant which may
effect the objectivity of his programming.' 26 Obviously, no broadcaster is
123 Id. at 32, 39-46 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
124 Id. at 51-55 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
125 Id. at 11,
125 In its opinion approving the transfer, the Commission stated that it recognized
the importance of preserving the freedom of a broadcast entity to render vital broadcast
services undeterred and uninfluenced by private, nonbroadcast interests under common
ownership with the broadcast enterprise. Surprisingly, the Commission then made the
following statement:
Fully recognizing this as the sine qua non of a reliable and healthy broadcast
service, we nevertheless find in our experience with numbers of other licensees
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entirely objective, since broadcasting necessarily reflects the subjective atti-
tudes of the various persons who disseminate information. Indeed, a large
percentage of broadcasting time is spent editorializing, and it is the presenta-
tion of many opinions that makes this medium such a great benefactor of
the public. The presence of substantial nonbroadcast interests within the
applicant's portfolio of political, social, and economic activities, however, may
encourage or coerce the applicant to compromise his programming prin-
ciples. 127
 The Commission has stated on many occasions that the licensee
cannot delegate his responsibility for programming to others, 128 and it is
apparent that the Commission does not want what effectively produces the
same result, namely, programming subordinated to, or adversely influenced
by, other interests.
This policy is reflected in many ways. For example, the Commission
makes an effort to determine the source of funds which will be used to
finance station operation. If someone other than the applicant is doing a
major portion of the financing, that person will be considered as a principal
in interest having a degree of control commensurate with his monetary in-
volvement. 12° If officers, directors, or major stockholders of a corporate appli-
who encompass, along with broadcast interests, large and diversified non-broad-
cast activities no indication of abuse of their public trust through the intrusion
of their non-broadcast concerns upon the objectivity of their news reporting
or commentary and no demonstrated detriment in any other programming
sectors.
Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 14. On the basis of past FCC considerations
in varying types of cases, this observation by the majority of commissioners would
appear open to question. Assuming the accuracy of the observation, however, it seems
that the FCC's policy of making case-by-case considerations would militate against a
summary dismissal of such a potentially important issue on the sole basis of past experi-
ence. This is especially true in the ITT-ABC case, literally unparalleled by prior FCC
cases, where the possibilities of adverse influence are so manifest. As early as 1931, the
Radio Commission, predecessor of the FCC, stated that:
When Congress provided that the question whether a license should be issued
or renewed should be dependent upon a finding of public interest, convenience,
or necessity, it very evidently had in mind that broadcasting should not be a
mere adjunct of a particular business . • .
KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
See Midland Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 611, 622-25 (1948), for a discussion of how
a licensee's close association with a major industrial firm affects the objectivity of the
licensee's programming. The FCC has frequently held, with respect to applicants repre-
senting religious or socio-politico-economic organizations, that a license can be granted
if the Commission is assured that the licensee will give a "fair break" to the views and
opinions of others. See, e.g., Noe v. FCC, 260 F.2d 739, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; WBNX
Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 837, 841 (1948). For strong arguments on the applicability
and seriousness of the possible influence of ITT's nonbroadcast interests on ABC's news
and public-affairs programming, see Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 11
(Bartley, Comm'r, dissenting); id. at 8-22 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
127 It must, of course, be remembered that while the Commission may consider the
political, social, and economic activities of the applicant, it cannot consider the unmani-
fested political, social, and economic views of the applicant. National Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1942).
128 See, e.g., Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., supra
note 101, at 500.
12D See WLOX Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 260 F.2d 712, 716 (1958).
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cant are involved in outside interests of a kind that could result in the
applicant having an unfair competitive advantage or having his program-
ming influenced to the detriment of the public, the FCC would consider this
adverse to the public interest.'" In considering an applicant who represents
an organization, such as a religious group, the Commission stresses that a
prime consideration is whether or not this applicant will give a "fair break"
to those who do not share its views.in
A corporate applicant seeking to acquire broadcast facilities will be
subject to the FCC's investigation of its financial structure, its stock dis-
tribution, and its business and nonbusiness interests. A financially sound
corporation, engaged in the manufacture of foodstuffs, machinery, or auto-
mobiles, for instance, would probably not have much difficulty in demon-
strating that its prime business interest would not influence its broadcast
subsidiary. On the other hand, a corporation depending on defense contracts
for its revenue might have greater difficulty convincing the Commission of
its "objectivity," since objective programming of news and documentaries
regarding the Government's domestic and foreign policy could strain the
licensee's relationship with the Government and adversely effect its competi-
tion for contracts. In the case of ITT, influential nonbroadcast interests are
readily apparent. ITT's widely diversified structure, its major interests in the
U.S. space and defense industries, and, most importantly, its reliance on
foreign holdings for a majority of its revenue, are factors which could pro-
duce pressure on ITT influencing its objectivity. This presents a complex
public-interest question for the FCC, and substantial consideration is re-
quired.
In the FCC opinion approving the transfer of ABC's stations, the dis-
senting commissioners pointed out that in many areas of the world, ITT
deals directly with the government rather than with private industry.'' A
situation is hypothesized in which such a government has been overthrown
by a military coup: the commissioners then ask what ITT would do if the
new government threatened to take control of its assets in that country
should ABC broadcast a documentary discrediting the new leaders.';" In
reply, ITT has given assurances that it will employ every safeguard to pro-
tect the integrity of ABC's news against influence, intended or not, by
ITT. 134 The dissenting commissioners state that they do not doubt the good
faith of those top executives who offered the assurances, but argue that,
despite good faith, the foreign interests of ITT must, realistically, pose a
substantial threat to ABC's programming."' They also argue that, as ITT's
present leadership changes, so might the inclination to protect the "objec-
130 See Sunbeam Television Corp. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 26 (1957).
131 Noe v. FCC, supra note 126; WBNX Broadcasting Co., supra note 126.
132 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 10-15 (Johnson, Comm'r, dis-
senting).
133 Id. at 15 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
134 See Broadcasting, Sept. 26, 1966, p. 48; Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note
8, at 16; Response to Specification, supra note 28, at 20 n.1.
135 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 17 (Johnson, Comm'r, dis-
senting).
932
CORPORATE ACQUISITION OF BROADCAST FACILITIES
tivity" of the broadcasting segment of the business.' 36 The arguments of
these commissioners, which were echoed by the Justice Department on recon-
sideration of the applications,137 must be considered carefully, for the possi-
bility of influence must be admitted.
The majority of the Commission indicated that it felt it could rely on
the assurances of ITT; that vague fears of adverse influence did not compel
disapproval of the applications; and that the Commission would closely
scrutinize the results of the merger in order to detect any undue influence.'"
The very nature of ITT, its great diversification, may militate against the
possibilities feared by the dissenting commissioners and the Justice Depart-
ment. The broadcast phase of ITT-ABC would be 13 per cent of the whole,
leaving 87 per cent of the corporation concerned with nonbroadcast inter-
ests. 1 " ITT is not dependent on any one, two, or three of its many activities.
Realizing the significance of ABC, which would be one of its largest sub-
sidiaries, ITT would not be likely to jeopardize the interests, or compromise
the integrity, of that broadcast network for the sake of some other enter-
prise. The President and Chairman of the Board of ITT has stated that
there is no foreign interest so important as to cause ITT to affect ABC's
news. He further commented that ABC could not get away with deliberately
slanting the news, since its competitors could easily expose it, thereby de-
stroying ABC's reputation and the network itself, 13 ' These comments are
based on logic and good business sense and go far toward overcoming the
fears of adverse influence.
The adverse-influence factor has received much attention from all parties
involved in the ITT-ABC merger case, and the Commission's finding that
the transfer of stations could not be denied on the basis of vague fears is
probably well founded. There is nothing in ITT's past to indicate that it
is likely to allow its vast nonbroadcast interests to adversely effect the im-
portant role which ABC plays in the broadcast medium. If the Commission
were to deny the transfer on the basis of these fears, it would be founding
its decision on mere possibilities, long recognized as insufficient grounds for
such denial.
V. ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF AN ITT-ABC MERGER
A. Antitrust and Broadcasting
There is uncontradicted judicial authority supporting the proposition
that the field of broadcasting should be one of "free competition."'" The
courts have implied this from the language of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934, in which Congress provided the FCC with the power to exempt
from the application of the antitrust laws the merger of communications
111° Id. at 17-18 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).137 Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 26, at 11.
1138 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 10.
131) Id. at 2 (Bartley, Comm'r, dissenting).
14° See Broadcasting, Nov. 21, 1966, p. 42. Protecting against unintended influence
is more difficult, but can be accomplished through the exercise of reasonable care.
141 United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
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companies, but not the merger of broadcast companies.'" However, "free
competition," as applied to the broadcast industry, appears to have a special
meaning. Insofar as the industry is regulated by the FCC, it is not "freely"
competitive. The FCC may restrict entry into the industry by refusing to
grant a licensel" or by regulating the expansion of a licensee through limita-
tion of the area or zone to be served by his station.'" The FCC may also
deny a license on the ground that too much competition might adversely
affect the public interest.'" On the other hand, the industry is freely com-
petitive in the sense that rates and finances are unregulated,'" and in the
sense that it remains subject to the antitrust laws,' 47 the purpose of which
is to protect competition.'"
Since the broadcast industry has been held subject to the antitrust laws,
the FCC may not approve a broadcast-license transfer if it would result in
a violation of the Clayton Act. Thus, even if the public benefit from the
transfer would outweigh its anticompetitive harm, the FCC must reject the
application.'" However, the FCC's authority to disapprove the transfer of
a broadcast license because it may lessen competition does not come directly
from the Clayton Act,'" but rather from its power under the Federal Com-
munications Act to determine whether such a transfer is in the public inter-
est; competition is an element of the FCC's public-interest standard. 15 "
In certain regulated industries, Congress has allowed for the balancing
of the positive aspects of a merger against those that are anticompetitive. 152
However, in other regulated industries, including broadcasting, Congress
142
 Ibid. See also 48 Stat. 1080, 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 221(a),
310(b) (1964); 57 Stat. 5 (1943), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (1964).
143 48 Stat. 1083 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1964).
144
 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1964).
145
 To license two stations where there is revenue for only one may result in
no good service at all. So economic injury to an existing station, while not in
and of itself a matter of moment, becomes important when on the facts it
spells diminution or destruction of service.
Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
146 Celler, Antitrust Problems in the Television Broadcasting Industry, 22 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 549, 551 (1957).
147 United States v. Radio Corp. of America, supra note 141.
148 See 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
149 "[T]he Federal Communications Commission . . . is obligated to administer its
regulatory activities in a manner harmonious with the purpose of [the antitrust] . . .
laws." (Emphasis added.) Celler, supra note 146, at 551.
15° The authority to enforce the Clayton Act in the broadcast industry is vested in
the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department. 38 Stat. 734, 736 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 21(a), 25 (1964).
151 Ceder, supra note 146, at 551.
152
 E.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §
5(11) (1964) (railroads and pipe-line carriers):
[A]ny carriers or other corporations, and their officers and employees and any
other persons, participating in a transaction approved or authorized under the
provisions of this section shall be and they are relieved from the operation of
anti-trust laws . . . insofar as may be necessary to enable them to carry into
effect the transaction so approved or provided for in accordance with the terms
and conditions, if any, imposed by the [ICCi . .
See also Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 770 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1964).
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has not so provided," 3 and the courts have accordingly refused to enter
the thicket of positive social and economic effects when considering questions
of antitrust. This is exemplified by the Supreme Court's statement in
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank:
We are clear . . . that a merger the effect of which "may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition" is not saved because, on some
ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may
be deemed beneficial. A value choice of such magnitude is beyond
the ordinary limits of judicial competence, and in any event has
been made for us already, by Congress when it enacted the amended
§ 7. Congress determined to preserve our traditionally competitive
economy. It therefore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the
benign and malignant alike, fully aware, we must assume, that
some price might have to be paid.' 64
Thus, the merger of ITT and ABC could be struck down on antitrust
grounds alone, despite the fact that the merger may result in extensive
public-interest benefits. The Justice Department has alleged that the merger
will violate Section 7 of the Clayton Acti"—that the effect of the acquisi-
tion of ABC by ITT "may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to
create a monopoly" in the network broadcast industry. Before examining
this contention, it is important to establish the line of commerce and the
relevant markets in which network organizations are involved. In order to
do this, it will first be necessary to describe the nature of the "network."
A broadcast network has been defined as a number of broadcast sta-
tions "in different localities, each related by contract with an operating
organization, pursuant to the terms of which it undertakes to and does
broadcast programs originating from the operating organization.""° ABC
is technically an operating organization, although it is commonly referred
to, and will be referred to herein, as a network. The role of a network is
to supply local stations with programs. These programs are provided under
affiliation agreements between the network and local stations, called affili-
ates.157 Besides arrangements with their affiliates, all three television net-
work organizations (ABC, CBS, and NBC) own and operate a number of
television and radio stations. 158 A network need not own and operate stations
in order for it to serve its affiliates, but network-owned stations have become
153 E,g., Bank Merger Act, 64 Stat. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964). See
construction of this section in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, .374 U.S. 321,
350-55 (1963).
154 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
155 Section 7 states in part:
ENJo corporation engaged in commerce . . shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in
any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
156 Salant, Fisher, & Brooks, The Functions and Practices of a Television Network,
22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 584, 585 (1957).
157 Id. at 586.
158 Ibid.
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an integral part of the present network organization, and, certainly from
the experience of ABC, are financially profitable assets. 159
The customers of a network organization are not, however, local
stations, but rather advertisers who buy network time and programs for the
purpose of broadcasting commercial messages.'" The networks, in turn,
pay the local stations for time in which to broadcast these messages and
programs. 161
 The networks' line of commerce may therefore be considered
as advertising. Although a network has been described as a "national ad-
vertising medium," 102
 the markets in which the network organizations com-
pete may range from national to local, depending on the regions in which
network customers desire to sell their products. The questions regarding line
of commerce and markets have not arisen as issues in the ITT-ABC pro-
ceedings before the Commission. However, these issues might arise if the
Justice Department should choose to bring an independent court action to
enjoin the merger under the Clayton Act. 163
A further question arises as to the classification of the merger as
horizontal, vertical, conglomerate, or product-extension. Turner has defined
a horizontal merger as an "acquisition by a producer of the stock or assets
of a firm producing an identical product or close substitute and selling it
in the same geographical market"; 164 a vertical merger as an "acquisition
of the stock or assets of a firm that buys the product sold by the acquirer
or sells a product bought by the acquirer"; 1 '' 5 and a conglomerate merger
as one that is neither horizontal nor verticalim The Supreme Court, however,
in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,197 carved out from conglomerate mergers
a fourth classification: the product-extension merger. This may be defined
as an acquisition of a company whose products are "complementary to those
of the acquiring company and may be produced with similar facilities,
marketed through the same channels and in the same manner, and adver-
tised by the same media . . . "168
No acquisition, however, would appear to be purely a horizontal, verti-
cal, conglomerate, or product-extension merger. The ITT-ABC merger
provides a good example. Since ITT and ABC are not competitors, 1 C 9 their
156 Profits from the ABC-owned stations were $16.2 million in 1963, $2L9 million
in 1964, and $25.5 million in 1965. These profits were used to offset losses in ABC's net-
work operations during these three years. Letter from Leonard H. Goldenson, President,
ABC, to FCC, July 25, 1966.
160
 Salant, Fisher & Brooks, supra note 156, at 586.
161 Ibid.
1 62
 Ibid.
163 The courts have historically considered the line of commerce and the markets
involved in a merger before determining whether the effect of a merger may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra
note 154; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
164 Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L.
Rev. 1313, 1315 (1965).
16 5
 Ibid.
166
 Ibid.
107 87 Sup. Ct. 1224 (1967).
1" Id. at 1230.
16° Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 9.
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merger would not on first impression appear to eliminate any horizontal
competition. However, the entry of ITT into the industry may serve to
eliminate potential competitors, which may influence actual horizontal
competition. Thus, it would have horizontal effects. Furthermore, ITT does
buy television and radio advertising, as ABC buys products sold by ITT.'"
Although the FCC did not find the ITT-ABC buyer-seller relationship
sufficient to classify the merger as vertica1, 171 the merger will certainly have
vertical ef ects. Ti the horizontal and vertical effects may be anticompetitive,
then the merger would violate the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers,
the effect of which may be to lessen competition.
The fact that similar technologies are involved in both the communica-
tions and broadcast industries suggests a ground for classifying ITT's acquisi-
tion of ABC as a product-extension merger. Furthermore, as technologies
develop, the communications and broadcast industries may use similar, if
not identical, facilities. An example of this is the Telstar satellite system, which
is used both for communications and broadcasting purposes. 172 However,
ABC's products, network time, and programs are not marketed "through the
same channels and in the same manner" as ITT's products. Therefore, in a
marketing sense, ITT's acquisition of ABC would not be a product-extension
merger. To properly classify the acquisition, one would have to say that it
falls between a conglomerate and product-extension merger and will have
both horizontal and vertical effects.
The classification of a merger, however, will not affect the standard
under which the merger's legality will be tested. In fact, the Supreme Court
has held that "all mergers are within the reach of § 7, and all must be tested
by the same standard, whether they are classified as horizontal, vertical,
conglomerate or other."' 7' The standard to which the Court is evidently
referring is that of Section 7 of the Clayton Act: whether the effect of such
acquisition may substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monop-
oly. 174 The classification of a merger does, however, help in describing what
the merger's effects on competition may be. It also indicates the problems
of proof involved with each merger. These problems increase as mergers
move from purely horizontal or vertical to conglomerate or product-extension,
since the effects of the latter types of mergers are more difficult to ascer-
tain. 175
B. Elimination of ITT as a Potential Competitor
The Justice Department contends that the proposed ITT-ABC merger
may injure competition through "the elimination of ITT as a potential
competitor in network broadcasting." 77° A potential competitor may be
defined as a person or corporation that will probably enter the relevant line
178 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 See generally Doyle, Communications Satellites: International Organization for
Development and Control, 55 Calif. L. Rev. 431 (1967).
173 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 167, at 1229-30.
174 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
175 See Turner, supra note 164, at 1394.
178 Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 26, at 6.
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of commerce independent of a merger, thereby posing a threat of a new
competitor. This possibility helps to maintain competition among the active
members of the industry. The effect of such a threat has been stated as
follows:
[P]otential competition ... as a substitute for [actual competition]
. . . may restrain producers from overcharging those to whom they
sell or underpaying those from whom they buy. . . Potential com-
petition, insofar as the threat survives . . may compensate in
part for the imperfection characteristic of actual competition in
the great majority of competitive markets.'"
The apparent basis for this effect on actual competition is a fear that
monopoly profits would encourage immediate entry by potential competi-
tors.
In two recent cases, United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.'" and
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.,179 the Supreme Court upheld the
elimination of a potential competitor as valid grounds on which to establish
a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. El Paso involved the horizontal
merger of two gas line transmission companies, Pacific Northwest and El
Paso. Before the merger, both companies had competed for entry into the
same market. Pacific Northwest, because of its smaller size, lost the market
to El Paso. Since only one transmission company was required to service the
market, entry was at least temporarily foreclosed to Pacific Northwest.
Nevertheless, the Court held that Pacific Northwest still remained a poten-
tial competitor and that its elimination was grounds for finding a violation
of section 7.
In Penn-Olin, two companies, Pennsalt and Olin-Mathieson, combined
in a joint venture for the production of sodium chlorate. The Court found
grounds for a possible section 7 violation on a theory that, if the two
companies had not combined in a joint venture, one company might have
entered the market while the other remained a significant potential competi-
tor. Thus, the joint venture might have eliminated the stimulus that would
have been provided by a potential competitor. 18°
Several criteria must be considered in determining whether ITT poses
a threat as a potential competitor to the network broadcast industry, and
whether the effect of its elimination as a potential competitor may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition. The following points were suggested by
Turner in his article on conglomerate mergers,181 and were among those
used by the Court in El Paso and Penn-Olin.
First, reference is made to the nature of the industry of the acquired
177 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964), quoting Wil-
cox, Competition and Monopoly in American Industry 7-8 (TNEC Monograph No. 21,
1940).
178
 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
178
 378 U.S. 158 (19fr4).
188 Before testing for a § 7 violation in Penn-Olin, the Court held that § 7 of the
Clayton Act was applicable to joint ventures. Id. at 170.
181 Turner, supra note 164, at 1362-86.
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company.' 82 If the industry were an oligopoly, the influence of potential
competitors on actual competition would be more significant than if the
industry were highly fragmented. In an oligopolistic industry, actual com-
petitors are theoretically more sensitive to the influence of potential com-
petitors, because a new entrant might upset the present favorable industry
structure. In a highly fragmented industry, the competitive effect of the
many actual competitors on each other would outweigh the influence of po-
tential competitors. There is no doubt that the network broadcast industry
is an oligopoly, with only three major television networks (ABC, CBS, and
NBC) and four major radio networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and Mutual) in
operation.183 Therefore, if ITT is a potential competitor, it theoretically
exerts significant influence on competition in the broadcast industry.
A second criterion is the number of potential competitors which pose
a threat to the industry of the acquired company.'84 If there were a large
number of potential competitors, the loss of only one through a merger
might not alone be sufficient to allow a finding that the merger may result
in a substantial lessening of competition. However, because of the nature
of the broadcast industry—the limited number of transmission frequencies,
the resources required to organize a network, the present ownership and
affiliations of broadcast stations in major local markets, and the regulated
entry into the broadcast industry—the formation of a new competitive net-
work may be highly unlikely if not virtually impossible. The two major
problems of a new network would be acquiring television affiliates in major
local markets and obtaining the required initial capital. The licenses in
most major local markets are now almost exclusively held by ABC, CBS,
NBC, or their affiliates. 185 Even with the expansion of available VHF and
UHF frequencies, the FCC cannot license many new stations in major
markets because of the problem of overlap. 186 As for the required amount
of capital, a study for a proposed "public television" network indicated a
required capital investment of approximately 5621 million. 187 Thus, the
number of potential competitors for the network broadcast industry appears
severely limited by the present structure of the industry, present technology,
and required capital. There are several major corporations which already
own broadcast stations and which could financially qualify as potential
competitors. 188 However, the fact that these corporations have not chosen
to enter the network broadcast industry over the past several years might
indicate a lack of interest, which, as will be seen, would disqualify them as
potential competitors. It can be concluded, therefore, that the number of
182 Id. at 1363.
193 There are also several smaller "networks" which either operate in localized areas
of the country or produce only specialty programs, such as sports broadcasts.
184 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., supra note 179, at 176-77.
185 Cellar, supra note 146, at 550. See also Brief for Applicant, p. 54, American
Broadcast Cos., No. 16828, FCC, Jan. 26, 1967.
186 Ibid.
187 Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, Public Television, A Program
for Action 147 (1967).
188 E.g., Storer Broadcasting Company; Taft Broadcasting Company; General Elec-
tric Company; RKO-General, Inc.; Time, Inc.; The Hearst Corporation.
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potential competitors posing a threat to actual competition in the industry,
if there are any, is small, and that the loss of one of them would significantly
lessen any fear that potential competitors will enter the market.
The third criterion for determining whether a corporation poses a
threat as a potential competitor is the corporation's resources. 1 N 1' A company
that does not have sufficient technical, managerial, and financial resources
to enter an industry or market and compete effectively upon entry could
not realistically influence competition as a potential entrant. There is no
question of ITT's capabilities and resources. Since ITT is a manufacturer
of communications and broadcasting equipment and the operator of several
communications systems, its work is closely related to the technical aspects
of network broadcasting. ITT also owns a news-communications system,
Press Wireless, Inc., which could act as the nucleus for a news-gathering
facility. However, ITT does not appear to have had any experience in the
programming field, nor does it have any personnel for gathering and report-
ing news. Therefore, whether it has the necessary resources to become by
itself a viable independent competitor in the network broadcast industry
poses a serious factual question.
A fourth criterion is the interest of the potential entrant to move into
the industry or market of the acquired firm. 190 Without the requisite interest
in entering this market, a potential entrant does not pose a threat to actual
competition. However, neither El Paso nor Penn-Olin set forth the standards
by which to measure interest, since in both cases it was evident that the
companies involved had strong interests in entering the relevant markets
in ways other than through a merger or joint venture. From ITT's interest
in acquiring ABC, it could be concluded that ITT has a strong interest
in entering the network broadcasting field. However, a distinction should
be drawn between entering a market through an acquisition and entering
a market as a new, independent competitor. The expense involved in the
latter may often exceed the cost of the former. This appears especially true
in the network broadcast industry with its limited supply of available broad-
cast stations and its high initial costs. Furthermore, an acquisition may be
accomplished through the exchange of stock, as in the case with ITT-ABC,
thus requiring little or no capital outlay on the part of the acquiring com-
pany. Therefore, it should not be concluded merely from ITT's interest in
acquiring ABC that ITT would be interested in entering the industry as a
new, independent competitor.
The potential-competitor theory has been most recently applied in
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.'" In that case, involving Procter's acquisition
of Clorox Bleach, the Supreme Court found that "the existence of Procter at
the edge of the [bleach I industry exerted considerable influence on the mar-
ket."' 92 ITT's technical and financial resources and its interest in the net-
work broadcast field suggest that ITT may be "at the edge" of ABC's
industry. However, as previously suggested, the paramount question is
189 United States v. El Paso Gas Co., supra note 178, at 660.
190
 Ibid.
]91 87 Sup. Ct. 1224 (1967).
192 Id. at 1231.
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whether the present networks so control major local broadcast stations
through network licenses or those of affiliates as to make it impossible for
a new, independent competitor to enter.
The present control of the broadcast industry by the major networks
might account for the fact that ITT, although "at the edge" of the
industry, has not previously entered independently.'" This barrier to entry
implies that there may be in fact no true "potential competitors" in the
network broadcast industry. Furthermore, in order to base a section 7
violation on a potential-competitor theory, it is necessary to show not only
that ITT is "at the edge" of the industry, but also that it exerts influence
as a potential competitor. Since the effect of this influence is mostly
psychological—fear of more competition—it is difficult to measure, and the
problems of proof under this theory appear to be major. Thus, any antitrust
theory based on the elimination of a potential competitor in the ITT-ABC
case is open to serious question.
C. Possible Elimination of ITT as an Operator of CATV Systems
The Justice Department has suggested that the ITT-ABC merger may
injure competition through "the possible elimination of ITT as an operator
of numerous and extensive CATV systems which might eventually be
capable of competing with conventional network broadcasting."'" However,
in order to prove an antitrust violation on such grounds, the Justice Depart-
ment would have to show that it will eventually be possible, given the
technology involved in CATV and the restrictive nature of FCC regulations,
to develop CATV systems capable of competing with network broadcasting.
If this were not possible, there would be no grounds for an action on a
theory of the merger's adverse effects on CATV development.'"
The FCC regulations define a CATV system as follows:
The term "community antenna television system" ("CATV sys-
tem") means any facility which receives and amplifies the sig-
nals transmitting programs broadcast by one or more television
stations and redistributes such signals by wire or cable to sub-
scribing members of the public, but such terms shall not include
(i) any such facility which serves fewer than fifty subscribers, or
(ii) any such facility which serves only the residents of one or
more apartment dwellings under common ownership, control, or
management, and commercial establishments located on the premises
of such an apartment house.'"
193 FCC regulations restrict to two years the time period through which affiliation
agreements may run. 47 C.F.R. § 73.133 (1966). ITT could solicit local stations as their
affiliation agreements expire, but an affiliation change appears difficult since it involves
technical and programming problems in addition to a change in contracts.
194 Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 26.
109 It is possible to argue that the merger will also lessen competition in the CATV
industry besides the network broadcast industry. This lessening of competition might
result from the combined resources of ABC and ITT. Such a lessening of competition,
if substantial, would be a violation of the Clayton Act since § 7 refers to "any line of
commerce" and not lust the line of commerce of the acquired firm.
196 47 C.F.R. § 74.1001(e) (1) (1966).
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A CATV system usually consists of a receiving antenna, which picks up
television signals from distant transmitting antennae, and a microwave
facility, which relays these signals through a cable system to local homes
(subscribers) in the CATV community." 7 CATV subscribers do not have
to install their own antennae, because subscribers' television receivers are
directly connected to the cable system.'" The microwave and cable systems
minimize interference, thus improving the quality of the signals received by
the CATV subscribers. CATV systems (antenna, microwave, and cable
facilities) are owned and operated by persons licensed by the FCC,'" who
receive their income by charging subscribers a fee for the CATV service.
There are two major problems with prophesying that CATV systems
might eventually be capable of competing with conventional network broad-
casting. First, CATV systems do not presently originate their own programs;
they merely transmit signals of other broadcasters. In order to compete with
conventional network broadcasting, it would appear that CATV systems
would have to begin originating programs and marketing these to adver-
tisers who would otherwise buy from the major networks. Although this
development is possible, it would require a major revision in the nature of
CATV operations, and is too speculative a basis on which to rest an antitrust
action.20°
Second, the FCC appears to have relegated CATV operators to a
position subordinate to conventional broadcasters. Under present FCC regu-
lations, a CATV operator must, upon request, carry the signals of local-
station licensees broadcasting in the area served by the CATV system.201
This means that a CATV system must serve local stations, many of which
are network affiliates. 202 The reason for this is clear. The CATV regula-
tions were promulgated to protect local community broadcasters from ex-
cessive competition from distant broadcasters whose signals may be brought
to the community via a CATV system. Since a CATV subscriber does not
have to erect a rooftop antenna in order to receive signals from the CATV
cable, he may be eliminated as a potential local-station viewer. With a
reduced potential audience, local stations would be unable to compete for
advertisers with stations carried over the CATV system. 203 Thus, the FCC,
by requiring CATV systems to carry the signals of local stations, places
these stations on a more equal competitive basis with distant broadcasters for
attracting audiences and, therefore, advertisers. In effect, then, CATV sys-
tems must, by carrying network programs, serve the same network with which
the Justice Department suggests CATV systems may possibly compete.
197 47 C.F.R. §§ 74.1001, .1083(a) (1966).
198 See Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 48 F.C.C. 683, 688 (1965).
199 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 74.1030, .1031, .1033 (1966).
200 In order to find a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, there must be a finding
that an acquisition will probably substantially lessen competition; a mere possibility is
not sufficient. Therefore, an antitrust action cannot be based on speculation. See 2
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4298 (1950).
201 47 C.F.R. § 74.1033(a) (1966).
292 The CATV system, however, need carry local station signals only when it is
possible to do this within the limits of the system's channel capacity. See ibid.
293 See Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, supra note 193, at 688-93.
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The FCC, by requiring that CATV systems carry UHF signals in addi-
tion to normal frequency signals, 204 has also recognized that the develop-
ment of UHF broadcasting is more important than the development of
CATV systems.205
 If CATV systems did not carry UHF signals, there would
be a loss of UHF audiences to CATV subscribers, since UHF reception, like
other local signals, usually requires an outside antenna. Furthermore, the
possible loss and splintering of audiences through CATV operations would
discourage market entry of UHF broadcasters. This would certainly be con-
trary to Congress' intent to expand UHF operations, impliedly expressed in
the 1962 amendment to the Federal Communications Act requiring all tele-
vision receivers shipped in interstate commerce to be capable of receiving
UHF signals. 2"
The FCC's attitude towards CATV is expressed in the FCC's statement
that CATV "serves the public interest when it acts as a supplement rather
than a substitute for off-the-air television service." 207 A substantial change
in the function of CATV would be required in order for it to become com-
petitive with network broadcasting. The occurrence of such a change ap-
pears to be too speculative a factor on which to theorize that CATV systems
could become competitive with network broadcasting. 208 Thus, even if ITT
were to withdraw from the development of CATV technology, this action
should not have any anticompetitive effects within the purview of the
Clayton Act.
D. Adverse Effect of Merger on Technological Development
The Justice Department has contended that the ITT-ABC merger
may injure competition through the "possible elimination of ITT as an
independent source of basic technological development which could lead
to new systems of communication which might multiply channels of access
204 47 C.F.R. §§ 74.1033(a) (1)-(3). Note that the regulation refers to "all com-
mercial and non-commercial educational stations." (Emphasis added.) See also Second
Report on CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 756-60 (1966).
205 See Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking re All CATV Systems, 1
F.C.C.2d 453, 468-72 (1965).
200 76 Stat. 150 (1962), 47 U.S.C. § 303(s) (1964).
207 Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, supra note 198, at 701. The FCC's attitude
toward CATV is also embodied in its statement that "if there is a significant risk that
CATV competition will destroy or seriously degrade the service offered by a television
broadcaster, our statutory duties require us to seek means to prevent this result." Id. at
700.
208 Sec text accompanying note 200 supra. A further difficulty which may inhibit
competition between CATV systems and conventional network broadcasting is the copy-
right problem which now faces CATV operators. Recently, a federal district court held
that a community antenna TV system's transmission of copyrighted motion pictures,
licensed for showing only on specified television stations from which the CATV system
picked up signals, constituted infringing performance under § 1 of the Copyright
Act. United Artists Television Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). This decision may force CATV operators either to discontinue transmitting
certain programs or to pay copyright holders for the right to show their programs.
Thus, CATV operators would no longer transmit wholly free television material, and
it would become financially more difficult for them to compete with conventional net-
work broadcasting.
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to the public and provide the basis for new entrants into network broad-
casting."209 The Department has also contended that, after acquiring ABC,
ITT would have "an interest in retarding the pace of the development and
application of technology which would lead to more competition in broad-
casting. "210
It appears that there are two types of technological development in
the network broadcasting field: that which contributes to the general im-
provement of the industry's product and that which makes the industry
more accessible to potential competitors 211
 It would be unreasonable to
assume that the ITT-ABC merger might retard general technological de-
velopment. A conglomerate would normally embark on an active research
and development program in order to improve the competitive position of the
acquired firm in its industry and market. The merger would provide increased
resources with which to carry out such a program.212
 Furthermore, the
Sherman Act would provide protection against any attempt by ITT to
restrict the licensing of newly developed radio and television apparatus
to certain broadcasters through contracts that would result in a restraint of
trade.213
However, the Justice Department's major concern seems to be directed
at the effect the proposed merger will have on the second type of technological
development, that which "could . . provide the basis for new entrants
into network broadcasting." 211 In claiming that the merger will serve to
retard such technological development, the Justice Department is, in
effect, asserting the following: A company which is a technological inno-
vator and which acquires a company involved in an area of rapid techno-
logical development will probably cease innovations which may assist
entry into the industry. Such a conclusion, however, appears contrary to
good business sense. If ITT does not develop techniques to increase com-
petition in network broadcasting, one of its manufacturing competitors
will. ITT is not the only innovator in the broadcast- and communications-
equipment industry, nor does it appear reasonable to conclude that ITT
will stand by, because of some notion that it must protect ABC, and watch
its (ITT's) competitors profit from new equipment developments. There-
fore, there appear no grounds for finding a probable lessening of competition
in network broadcasting on a theory that the merger will retard technology.
Again, a section 7 violation cannot be founded on mere speculation. 215
209 Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 26.
210 Letter from Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney-General for the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department, to the FCC, Dec. 20, 1966.
211
 An example of the first type is color television, of the second type CATV.
212
 This would be especially true in the case of ABC and ITT, since ABC claims
that it requires additional resources in order to become more competitive in color tele-
vision.
213 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964). See also United
States v. Radio Corp. of America, 1958 Trade Cas. 4 69164 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
214 Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 26.
215 See note 200 supra.
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E. Threat of Illegal Reciprocal Dealings
The Justice Department contends that ITT, as a conglomerate giant,
could pressure its suppliers of technical equipment, components, and other
materials, who are also significant radio and television advertisers, to use
the ABC network in return for ITT's business:216 This could foreclose a
segment of the network advertising market from the reach of ABC's com-
petitors by removing the advertising business of ITT's suppliers and thereby
substantially lessening competition in network broadcasting.217
"Reciprocity" has been defined as "the practice whereby a company,
overtly or tacitly, agrees to conduct one or more aspects of its business so
as to confer a benefit on the other party to the agreement; the considera-
tion being the return promise in kind by the other party,;'218 or, more
simply, the elementary business practice, "I will buy from you if you will
buy from me."2 " The danger of a section 7 violation arises when, as the
result of an acquisition, reciprocal dealings foreclose a segment of the market
from competition:22° The "evil" in reciprocity is that it
transforms substantial buying power into a weapon for "denying
competitors less favorably situated access to the market." It dis-
torts the focus of the trader by interposing between him and the
traditional competitive factors of price, quality, and service an
irrelevant and alien factor which is destructive of fair and free
competition on the basis of merit. 221
In two recent cases, United States v. General Dynamics Corp. 222 and
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Carp.,''-"-m reciprocity was used as the grounds
on which to invalidate a merger. The General Dynamics case illustrates that
for reciprocity to have substantial adverse effects, the conglomerate's pur-
chases from its suppliers must be so substantial that they would be willing
to risk losing the business of the conglomerate's competitors by showing
undue preference to the conglomerate in reciprocal trading. 224 In their
reciprocal purchases from the conglomerate, the suppliers might also be
willing to accept noncompetitive price, quality, service, and reliability. 225
Consolidated Foods and General Dynamics also illustrate that a minimal
amount of probable foreclosure to competition in the market of the acquired
firm will be sufficient to establish a merger as violating section 7. The
1! 111
 Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 26, at 10.
217
 See generally Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 Harv.
L. Rev. 873 (1964).
218
 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 57 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
215 Krash, The Legality of Reciprocity Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 9
Antitrust Bull. 93 (1964).
220 See Hausman, supra note 217.
221
 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., supra note 218, at 59,
222 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
223 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
224
 Sec Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 1313 (1965).
225 258 F. Supp. at 59.
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Supreme Court in Consolidated Foods accepted a showing of a 3 per cent
foreciosure228 and, in General Dynamics, the district court accepted 5 per
cent,227 probably because both cases involved oligopolistic industries. In
General Dynamics, the court expressly adopted the rule set forth in United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank that in an already concentrated market,
"the importance of preventing even slight increases in concentration and so
preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration is . . . great." 228 (Em-
phasis added.) Since the network broadcast industry is also an oligopoly, it
appears that it would only be necessary to find the probability that the
ITT-ABC merger would foreclose a minimal amount of the network adver-
tising market in order to find that the merger may substantially lessen com-
petition. Consolidated Foods further points out that there need be no
definite proof that ITT-ABC will engage in reciprocal dealings; there need
only be found the probability that reciprocal buying will occur. 220
Consolidated Foods and General Dynamics suggest certain questions
that should be asked of the ITT-ABC merger: Does ITT purchase products
from companies that are significant radio and television advertisers? Is ITT
one of these companies' leading purchasers? Is ITT, therefore, in a position
to use leverage to force or "encourage" reciprocal dealing? Is it probable
that such reciprocal dealings will foreclose a significant section of the net-
work advertising market, given an oligopoly, leading to a lessening of
competition? Whether ITT has the power to influence its suppliers to
purchase advertising from ABC, thus foreclosing a segment of the adver-
tising market and lessening competition, will be greatly a function of the
size of ITT's purchases from suppliers who are also significant radio and
television advertisers. This is a question of fact which remains to be
answered.
F. "Deep Pocket" Theory
A fifth antitrust theory is that ITT, as a large company with exten-
sive technical and financial resources, will be able to provide a "deep pocket"
from which ABC, a smaller company in an oligopolistic industry, may draw
to the detriment of its competition.2" Although the Justice Department has
not yet chosen to use this theory in the case, the ITT-ABC merger presents
a fact situation almost identical to three cases in which the Federal Trade
Commission found section 7 violations on a "deep pocket" theory.231 These
cases involved the acquisition of a company in an oligopolistic industry by
a larger company with extensive resources.232
 In each of these cases, the
220 380 U.S. at 595.
227 258 F. Supp. at 50.
220 374 U.S. 321, 365 n.42 (1963).
229 380 U.S. at 600.
230
 See generally Note, 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 392 (1966).
231 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 1224 (1967); Ekco Prods. Co. v.
FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965); Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
232
 Procter acquired Clorox, which alone controlled about 50% of the bleach
market and, with five other firms, controlled about 80%. Ekco acquired the McClintock
and Blackman companies, which prior to divestiture had controlled approximately 90%
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acquired company controlled the most substantial share of the relevant
market prior to the merger, so that the "deep pocket" of the acquiring
company posed a definite danger of further increasing concentration. No
other company in the line of commerce had access to resources similar to
those of the acquired company after the merger. However, in the ITT-ABC
case, the acquired company, ABC, does not control the most substantial
share of the network advertising market, and there is already present in
the line of commerce of the acquired company a major corporation (RCA)
that provides a "deep pocket" for a competing network (NBC).
Despite these variations, the "deep pocket" theory could still be applied.
Although ABC is not the leading competitor in network broadcasting, ITT
may still provide ABC with resources sufficient to lead to a substantial
lessening of competition in network broadcasting. The competitors who
stand to be affected most seriously by the merger are CBS and Mutual, since
they do not have a "deep pocket" such as RCA on which to draw. With its
financial "deep pocket," ABC would be able to experiment with new pro-
gramming techniques and could afford to absorb the loss of failures more
readily than could CBS or Mutual.
Certainly the development of new programming techniques and
broadcasting technology is not anticompetitive in itself, but the issue is
whether such development may lead to a substantial lessening of competi-
tion in the network broadcast industry. 233 In FTC v. Procter & Gamble
Co., the Supreme Court, in upholding the FTC's application of the "deep
pocket" theory, based its decision, at least in part, on the ground that
Procter & Gamble's advertising resources would give Clorox, the acquired
firm, a considerable advantage over its competitors. 234
 The Court did not
require any direct proof that Procter & Gamble would use its advertising
power to lessen competition in the bleach industry, but appeared to base
its decision merely on the grounds that Procter & Gamble had the resources
and opportunity to do so. 23" The question under the "deep pocket" theory
should, therefore, be whether ITT can provide ABC with the financial and
technical resources necessary to give ABC an advantage over its competitors
that would substantially lessen competition in the broadcast industry.
The FCC did consider the size and resources of ITT and concluded that
the merger would strengthen ABC's competitive effectiveness, but would
not enable ABC to dominate the network broadcast industry. 2" The Com-
mission thus used the "deep pocket" theory to draw a conclusion opposite
from what would be the usual consequence: ITT, as a large conglomerate,
will be able to provide a deep pocket of resources from which ABC may
draw to the enhancement of competition. 237 The FCC appears to have based
of the market in commercial meat-handling equipment. Reynolds acquired Arrow
Brands, Inc., which competed with eight firms in converting aluminum foil for florist
wrappings. Arrow controlled approximately 33% of the market.
253 This is an instance where public-interest benefits clash with anticompetitive
harms.
254 87 Sup. Ct. 1224, 1230 (1967).
256 Ibid.
236 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8.
237
 See Note, supra note 230, at 395.
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this conclusion on the theory that the merger would place ABC in a better
position to compete with the larger network broadcasters. The Commission's
conclusion that the merger would not enable ABC to dominate the network
broadcast industry appears correct, since the RCA-NBC combination will
offer considerable competition to its ITT-ABC counterpart. 238 However, the
Commission apparently failed to examine the merger's effect on CBS and
the Mutual Network, each of whose resources after the merger would be
smaller than ABC's.
It also appears that the Commission failed to examine the merger's
effect upon potential competitors, for whom the prospect of having to face
a giant in the place of ABC might militate against entry. In Procter &
Gamble, the Supreme Court found that "the substitution of the powerful
acquiring firm [Procter] for the smaller . . . firm [Clorox] may substantially
reduce the competitive structure of the industry by raising entry barriers
. . . "23°
 The Court found that Procter could divert a large portion of its
advertising budget to meet the short-term threat of a new entrant into the
bleach industry, and, "thus, a new entrant would be much more reluctant to
face the giant Procter than it would have been to face the smaller Clorox. ,,240
Similarly, ITT could use its resources to meet the threat of a new network
entrant and thus frighten off any potential competitors. However, this
argument may not be applicable if the network broadcast industry has
no actual potential entrants. Furthermore, if the industry does have any
potential entrants, they would most likely be of such a size that they would
not fear the "giant" ITT. All these considerations, however, raise issues
that the FCC apparently failed to examine.
G. Further Antitrust Considerations
The ITT-ABC merger raises at least two more questions with anti-
trust implications. First, would the merger allow ITT such a "vast amount
of preferential publicity" that it may tend to lessen competition in the
electronics and communications industries, 241
 and, second, would an adverse
finding in the ITT-ABC case require a divestiture action against RCA and
NBC?
The first question involves a reverse "deep pocket" effect, with the
acquiring firm gaining not financial resources, but publicity and advertising
power from the "deep pocket" of the acquired. The advertising could come in
the form of ABC broadcast station announcements reminding the public
that it is receiving a service of ITT, in the form of ABC news stories publi-
cizing ITT and its accomplishments, and in the form of inclusion of ITT
23 g However, the ITT-ABC combination will exceed the RCA-NBC combination
in both gross sales and assets. In 1965, ITT's gross sales were $1,783 million and
ABC's, $476 million. RCA's sales (including those of NBC) were $2,042 million. In
1965, ITT's assets amounted to $2,022 million, alone exceeding RCA's assets of $1,269
million. Fortune, July 15, 1966, p. 232; Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at
2 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
22° 87 Sup. Ct. at 1230.
24° Ibid.
241 See Philco Corp. v. FCC, 293 F.2d 864, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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in the call letters of ABC stations. More directly, ITT could be given
preference in sponsoring major ABC network productions. Thus, ITT's
competitive position in the electronics and communications markets could
be significantly enhanced. 242
In this regard, one complaint has already been made against RCA
for its preferential use of NBC's publicity facilities to improve the competi-
tive position of RCA's products.243 The FCC has the power under the
public-interest standard of the Federal Communications Act to refuse to
renew a broadcast license if it finds that the applicant has participated in
anticompetitive practices. 244 When RCA applied for renewal of NBC's
Philadelphia television license, the Philco Corporation intervened as an
interested party and charged that "NBC affords RCA 'a vast amount of
preferential pubUity' not available to Philco or other competitors of RCA
and so is 'directly instrumental in expanding the adverse effects of RCA's
[monopoly] practices." 246 The FCC, after hearing oral arguments, dis-
missed Philco's protest and renewed NBC's Philadelphia license without an
evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that Philco's "protest alleges present misconduct with the
particularity the statute requires [for an evidentiary hearing]" and remanded
the case to the FCC. 246 On remand, RCA was eventually denied renewal of
its Philadelphia license on grounds other than preferential publicity. 247 Al-
though the FCC failed to make a definitive statement regarding the use of
the publicity facilities of a broadcast station by a parent company, the court
of appeals' holding implies that preferential-publicity practices which have
anticompetitive effects would serve as sufficient grounds to disqualify a license
applicant under the FCC's public-interest standard.
ITT will certainly have the same opportunity to use ABC as RCA has
to use NBC. Although the RCA case was based on existing evidence of
actual antitrust practices, the FCC would now have to base a decision to
refuse license transfers to ITT on the grounds that ITT would probably
use the facilities of ABC for monopolistic purposes. However, after the
Supreme Court's decision in Procter & Gamble, the mere opportunity of ITT
to use ABC's advertising facilities to gain more control in the market may
be sufficient grounds to find a violation of the Clayton Act, if that added
control may result in a substantial lessening of competition in the electronics
and communications industry.
The second question involves the FCC's belief that to disallow the
ABC license transfers would require a divestiture action against RCA and
NBC. The FCC has itself stated that it "could not in good conscience for-
242 The Justice Department has also suggested that "the availability of adver-
tising time on its own network to an enterprise like ITT, increasingly involved in
consumer goods and services, may give it an advantage over its competitors in those
fields by enabling it to take advantage of unsold advertising time." Letter from Donald
F. Turner, supra note 210.
245 Philco Corp. v. FCC, supra note 241, at 866.
244 Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
245 Philco Corp. v. FCC, supra note 241, at 866.
246 Id. at 867.
247 National Broadcasting Co., 37 F.C.C. 427 (1964).
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bid ABC to merge with ITT without instituting proceedings to separate NBC
from RCA, both which are bigger than the respective principals in this
case."249 The means by which the FCC would separate NBC from RCA are
not clear. One of the simplest ways would be to refuse to renew RCA's
licenses as they expire, or to renew them on the condition that RCA divest
itself of NBC. 249 However, in order to assure that its action benefited the
public interest, the FCC would, in effect, have to supervise the establish-
ment of a new company that would provide at least the same level of broad-
cast service as RCA-NBC now furnishes. It is questionable whether the
FCC has the ability to supervise the divestiture and creation of companies
of this scale, since it is not usually involved in such cases.""-50
It may be argued that the public interest would best be served not by
ordering RCA to divest itself of NBC, but by maintaining the status quo
in the network industry. This would at least sustain the present level of
broadcasting. However, if the FCC were to find that the RCA-NBC combina-
tion did violate the antitrust laws, it would have to order divestiture even
if the result would be a major diminution of service to the public. This is
because the antitrust laws take precedence over the other public-interest
standards of the FCC.251 That an FCC action against RCA-NBC could result
in a major diminution of service appears unfortunate and suggests that the
Federal Communications Act should be amended to allow the antitrust con-
siderations of station licensing to be balanced against other public-interest
considerations.
H. Antitrust Aspects: Conclusion
The foregoing has illustrated many grounds upon which the ITT-ABC
merger may violate the Clayton Act. Some theories for attack appear more
reasonable than others, but all commonly lack a delineated test by which
to determine the legality of the conglomerate or product-extension merger.
For example, although these theories require a showing of a probability,
not possibility, of a lessening of competition, 252 there is no judicial guideline
as to when the merger complainant has carried his burden of proof so as to
establish the transition from possibility to probability. The fact that the
grounds on which to attack a conglomerate merger may at times appear un-
clear and tenuous may be attributed to the fact that there have been few
cases decided by the Supreme Court involving conglomerate, and now
product-extension, mergers under section 7. 259 The courts and agencies have
had little experience with this type of merger, as opposed to horizontal and
298 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 18.
240 The FCC took similar action on a lesser scale when it refused to renew RCA's
Philadelphia television license. National Broadcasting Co., supra note 247.
250
 The supervision of divestiture actions would be more within the expertise of
the Federal Trade Commission and the courts. However, the courts have been hesitant
to order divestiture when the "cure" appeared worse than the "disease." E.g., United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347
U.S. 521 (1954).
251
 United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
252 See note 200 supra.
253
 Turner, supra note 224, at 1314.
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vertical mergers, where the tests of legality appear to have crystallized. 254
However, the problem of determining whether a conglomerate or product-
extension merger will result in a section 7 violation may also be attributed
to the complex theories on which these mergers have been attacked. There
are frequently problems of proof involved in each theory.255 How does the
complainant actually establish that the acquiring company was a potential
competitor? How is the number of other potential competitors determined?
What type of technological developments may a merger retard; does a
court or an agency have the expertise to answer this question? How does the
court measure a potential entrant's "fear" of a "giant"? How deep does a
"deep pocket" have to be before there may be a substantial lessening of com-
petition?
The very theories which the Justice Department has proposed for
testing the legality of the ITT-ABC merger may in fact be frustrating the
enforcement of the Clayton Act. These theories are based on subtle economic
arguments, which may not be what Congress intended. As Professor Donovan
has pointed out:
The issue under the statute [Clayton Act] is not whether com-
petition in the economic sense may be hurt, but whether competi-
tion in the legislative sense is likely to be injured. The alarm over
economic concentration expressed by the framers of the legisla-
tion necessitates drawing the conclusion that Congress considered
concentration and oligopoly as the antithesis of competition. 25°
These remarks by Professor Donovan suggest that the test of the legality
of the ITT-ABC merger under the Clayton Act should be simply whether
the merger will tend to perpetuate the concentration and present oligopoly
of the network broadcast industry. The mere fact that ITT is a giant and
that approval of the ITT-ABC merger may clear the way for the acquisi-
tion of CBS by another giant should be sufficient to establish this.
In United States v. Von's Grocery Co., the Supreme Court held that the
terms of section 7 "look not merely to the actual present effect of a merger
but instead to its effect upon future competition." 257 With the presence of
two giants, and possibly three, in the commercial network broadcast industry,
it would be unreasonable to expect that there would be entry of any further
competition. An industry structure would result similar to that of the Ameri-
can automobile industry, if there is not already a similarity. Would it be
reasonable to expect that someone would enter that industry and attempt
to compete with General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors?
When the Supreme Court spoke of concentration in the Von's case, it
stated that, "where concentration is gaining momentum in a market, we
254 Ibid.
255 The problems of proof involved in the theories discussed above should serve
as illustrations.
256 Donovan, The Legality of Acquisitions and Mergers Involving American and
Foreign Corporations Under the United States Antitrust Laws—Part II, 40 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 51 (1967).
257 384 U.S, 270, 277 (1966).
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must be alert to carry out Congress' intent to protect competition against the
ever-increasing concentration through mergers."258 The ITT-ABC merger
may not increase the concentration in the network broadcast industry, al-
though it may shift the market shares among the existing competitors. The
merger will, however, tend to perpetuate this concentration. When Congress
amended section 7 in 1950, it expressed concern over "the extent to which
the American economy has become concentrated and centralized in the hands
of a few giant corporations." 25° It is therefore doubtful that Congress in-
tended to make a distinction between mergers that increase concentration
and those that perpetuate it.
The FCC has itself recognized that the ITT-ABC merger will increase
concentration "within the broad framework of the general economy."260 The
merger will place ITT within the top twenty industrials in the country in
sales. The FCC appears to assume that the fact that other industries will be
larger than the new ITT saves the merger from the antitrust laws.261 This
assumption is clearly wrong. Congress was not only concerned with the rela-
tive size of major corporations to each other, but also with their size rela-
tive to the general economy. It is very likely that the ITT-ABC merger
is exactly the type of increasing bigness that Congress intended to stop
under the Clayton Act.
PETER W. BRADBURY
JAMES A. CHAMPY
258 Ibid.
250 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4295 0950). See also Donovan, supra note 256.
260 Opinion Approving Transfer, supra note 8, at 12.
261 Ibid.
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